Search Results: "ecki"

6 May 2023

Reproducible Builds: Reproducible Builds in April 2023

Welcome to the April 2023 report from the Reproducible Builds project! In these reports we outline the most important things that we have been up to over the past month. And, as always, if you are interested in contributing to the project, please visit our Contribute page on our website.

General news Trisquel is a fully-free operating system building on the work of Ubuntu Linux. This month, Simon Josefsson published an article on his blog titled Trisquel is 42% Reproducible!. Simon wrote:
The absolute number may not be impressive, but what I hope is at least a useful contribution is that there actually is a number on how much of Trisquel is reproducible. Hopefully this will inspire others to help improve the actual metric.
Simon wrote another blog post this month on a new tool to ensure that updates to Linux distribution archive metadata (eg. via apt-get update) will only use files that have been recorded in a globally immutable and tamper-resistant ledger. A similar solution exists for Arch Linux (called pacman-bintrans) which was announced in August 2021 where an archive of all issued signatures is publically accessible.
Joachim Breitner wrote an in-depth blog post on a bootstrap-capable GHC, the primary compiler for the Haskell programming language. As a quick background to what this is trying to solve, in order to generate a fully trustworthy compile chain, trustworthy root binaries are needed and a popular approach to address this problem is called bootstrappable builds where the core idea is to address previously-circular build dependencies by creating a new dependency path using simpler prerequisite versions of software. Joachim takes an somewhat recursive approach to the problem for Haskell, leading to the inadvertently humourous question: Can I turn all of GHC into one module, and compile that? Elsewhere in the world of bootstrapping, Janneke Nieuwenhuizen and Ludovic Court s wrote a blog post on the GNU Guix blog announcing The Full-Source Bootstrap, specifically:
[ ] the third reduction of the Guix bootstrap binaries has now been merged in the main branch of Guix! If you run guix pull today, you get a package graph of more than 22,000 nodes rooted in a 357-byte program something that had never been achieved, to our knowledge, since the birth of Unix.
More info about this change is available on the post itself, including:
The full-source bootstrap was once deemed impossible. Yet, here we are, building the foundations of a GNU/Linux distro entirely from source, a long way towards the ideal that the Guix project has been aiming for from the start. There are still some daunting tasks ahead. For example, what about the Linux kernel? The good news is that the bootstrappable community has grown a lot, from two people six years ago there are now around 100 people in the #bootstrappable IRC channel.

Michael Ablassmeier created a script called pypidiff as they were looking for a way to track differences between packages published on PyPI. According to Micahel, pypidiff uses diffoscope to create reports on the published releases and automatically pushes them to a GitHub repository. This can be seen on the pypi-diff GitHub page (example).
Eleuther AI, a non-profit AI research group, recently unveiled Pythia, a collection of 16 Large Language Model (LLMs) trained on public data in the same order designed specifically to facilitate scientific research. According to a post on MarkTechPost:
Pythia is the only publicly available model suite that includes models that were trained on the same data in the same order [and] all the corresponding data and tools to download and replicate the exact training process are publicly released to facilitate further research.
These properties are intended to allow researchers to understand how gender bias (etc.) can affected by training data and model scale.
Back in February s report we reported on a series of changes to the Sphinx documentation generator that was initiated after attempts to get the alembic Debian package to build reproducibly. Although Chris Lamb was able to identify the source problem and provided a potential patch that might fix it, James Addison has taken the issue in hand, leading to a large amount of activity resulting in a proposed pull request that is waiting to be merged.
WireGuard is a popular Virtual Private Network (VPN) service that aims to be faster, simpler and leaner than other solutions to create secure connections between computing devices. According to a post on the WireGuard developer mailing list, the WireGuard Android app can now be built reproducibly so that its contents can be publicly verified. According to the post by Jason A. Donenfeld, the F-Droid project now does this verification by comparing their build of WireGuard to the build that the WireGuard project publishes. When they match, the new version becomes available. This is very positive news.
Author and public speaker, V. M. Brasseur published a sample chapter from her upcoming book on corporate open source strategy which is the topic of Software Bill of Materials (SBOM):
A software bill of materials (SBOM) is defined as a nested inventory for software, a list of ingredients that make up software components. When you receive a physical delivery of some sort, the bill of materials tells you what s inside the box. Similarly, when you use software created outside of your organisation, the SBOM tells you what s inside that software. The SBOM is a file that declares the software supply chain (SSC) for that specific piece of software. [ ]

Several distributions noticed recent versions of the Linux Kernel are no longer reproducible because the BPF Type Format (BTF) metadata is not generated in a deterministic way. This was discussed on the #reproducible-builds IRC channel, but no solution appears to be in sight for now.

Community news On our mailing list this month: Holger Levsen gave a talk at foss-north 2023 in Gothenburg, Sweden on the topic of Reproducible Builds, the first ten years. Lastly, there were a number of updates to our website, including:
  • Chris Lamb attempted a number of ways to try and fix literal : .lead appearing in the page [ ][ ][ ], made all the Back to who is involved links italics [ ], and corrected the syntax of the _data/sponsors.yml file [ ].
  • Holger Levsen added his recent talk [ ], added Simon Josefsson, Mike Perry and Seth Schoen to the contributors page [ ][ ][ ], reworked the People page a little [ ] [ ], as well as fixed spelling of Arch Linux [ ].
Lastly, Mattia Rizzolo moved some old sponsors to a former section [ ] and Simon Josefsson added Trisquel GNU/Linux. [ ]

Debian
  • Vagrant Cascadian reported on the Debian s build-essential package set, which was inspired by how close we are to making the Debian build-essential set reproducible and how important that set of packages are in general . Vagrant mentioned that: I have some progress, some hope, and I daresay, some fears . [ ]
  • Debian Developer Cyril Brulebois (kibi) filed a bug against snapshot.debian.org after they noticed that there are many missing dinstalls that is to say, the snapshot service is not capturing 100% of all of historical states of the Debian archive. This is relevant to reproducibility because without the availability historical versions, it is becomes impossible to repeat a build at a future date in order to correlate checksums. .
  • 20 reviews of Debian packages were added, 21 were updated and 5 were removed this month adding to our knowledge about identified issues. Chris Lamb added a new build_path_in_line_annotations_added_by_ruby_ragel toolchain issue. [ ]
  • Mattia Rizzolo announced that the data for the stretch archive on tests.reproducible-builds.org has been archived. This matches the archival of stretch within Debian itself. This is of some historical interest, as stretch was the first Debian release regularly tested by the Reproducible Builds project.

Upstream patches The Reproducible Builds project detects, dissects and attempts to fix as many currently-unreproducible packages as possible. We endeavour to send all of our patches upstream where appropriate. This month, we wrote a large number of such patches, including:

diffoscope development diffoscope version 241 was uploaded to Debian unstable by Chris Lamb. It included contributions already covered in previous months as well a change by Chris Lamb to add a missing raise statement that was accidentally dropped in a previous commit. [ ]

Testing framework The Reproducible Builds project operates a comprehensive testing framework (available at tests.reproducible-builds.org) in order to check packages and other artifacts for reproducibility. In April, a number of changes were made, including:
  • Holger Levsen:
    • Significant work on a new Documented Jenkins Maintenance (djm) script to support logged maintenance of nodes, etc. [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ]
    • Add the new APT repo url for Jenkins itself with a new signing key. [ ][ ]
    • In the Jenkins shell monitor, allow 40 GiB of files for diffoscope for the Debian experimental distribution as Debian is frozen around the release at the moment. [ ]
    • Updated Arch Linux testing to cleanup leftover files left in /tmp/archlinux-ci/ after three days. [ ][ ][ ]
    • Mark a number of nodes hosted by Oregon State University Open Source Lab (OSUOSL) as online and offline. [ ][ ][ ]
    • Update the node health checks to detect failures to end schroot sessions. [ ]
    • Filter out another duplicate contributor from the contributor statistics. [ ]
  • Mattia Rizzolo:


If you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please visit our Contribute page on our website. However, you can get in touch with us via:

28 April 2023

Enrico Zini: Handling keyboard-like devices

CNC control panel and Bluetooth pedal page turner I acquired some unusual input devices to experiment with, like a CNC control panel and a bluetooth pedal page turner. These identify and behave like a keyboard, sending nice and simple keystrokes, and can be accessed with no drivers or other special software. However, their keystrokes appear together with keystrokes from normal keyboards, which is the expected default when plugging in a keyboard, but not what I want in this case. I'd also like them to be readable via evdev and accessible by my own user. Here's the udev rule I cooked up to handle this use case: 
# Handle the CNC control panel
SUBSYSTEM=="input", ENV ID_VENDOR =="04d9", ENV ID_MODEL =="1203", \
   OWNER="enrico", ENV ID_INPUT =""
# Handle the Bluetooth page turner
SUBSYSTEM=="input", ENV ID_BUS =="bluetooth", ENV LIBINPUT_DEVICE_GROUP =="*/ mac ", ENV ID_INPUT_KEYBOARD ="1" \
   OWNER="enrico", ENV ID_INPUT ="", SYMLINK+="input/by-id/bluetooth- mac -kbd"
SUBSYSTEM=="input", ENV ID_BUS =="bluetooth", ENV LIBINPUT_DEVICE_GROUP =="*/ mac ", ENV ID_INPUT_TABLET ="1" \
   OWNER="enrico", ENV ID_INPUT ="", SYMLINK+="input/by-id/bluetooth- mac -tablet"
The bluetooth device didn't have standard rules to create /dev/input/by-id/ symlinks so I added them. In my own code, I watch /dev/input/by-id with inotify to handle when devices appear or disappear. I used udevadm info /dev/input/event to see what I could use to identify the device. The Static device configuration via udev page of libinput's documentation has documentation on the various elements specific to the input subsystem Grepping rule files in /usr/lib/udev/rules.d was useful to see syntax examples. udevadm test /dev/input/event was invaluable for syntax checking and testing my rule file while working on it. Finally, this is an extract of a quick prototype Python code to read keys from the CNC control panel: 
import libevdev
KEY_MAP =  
    libevdev.EV_KEY.KEY_GRAVE: "EMERGENCY",
    # InputEvent(EV_KEY, KEY_LEFTALT, 1)
    libevdev.EV_KEY.KEY_R: "CYCLE START",
    libevdev.EV_KEY.KEY_F5: "SPINDLE ON/OFF",
    # InputEvent(EV_KEY, KEY_RIGHTCTRL, 1)
    libevdev.EV_KEY.KEY_W: "REDO",
    # InputEvent(EV_KEY, KEY_LEFTALT, 1)
    libevdev.EV_KEY.KEY_N: "SINGLE STEP",
    # InputEvent(EV_KEY, KEY_LEFTCTRL, 1)
    libevdev.EV_KEY.KEY_O: "ORIGIN POINT",
    libevdev.EV_KEY.KEY_ESC: "STOP",
    libevdev.EV_KEY.KEY_KPPLUS: "SPEED UP",
    libevdev.EV_KEY.KEY_KPMINUS: "SLOW DOWN",
    libevdev.EV_KEY.KEY_F11: "F+",
    libevdev.EV_KEY.KEY_F10: "F-",
    libevdev.EV_KEY.KEY_RIGHTBRACE: "J+",
    libevdev.EV_KEY.KEY_LEFTBRACE: "J-",
    libevdev.EV_KEY.KEY_UP: "+Y",
    libevdev.EV_KEY.KEY_DOWN: "-Y",
    libevdev.EV_KEY.KEY_LEFT: "-X",
    libevdev.EV_KEY.KEY_RIGHT: "+X",
    libevdev.EV_KEY.KEY_KP7: "+A",
    libevdev.EV_KEY.KEY_Q: "-A",
    libevdev.EV_KEY.KEY_PAGEDOWN: "-Z",
    libevdev.EV_KEY.KEY_PAGEUP: "+Z",
 
class KeyReader:
    def __init__(self, path: str):
        self.path = path
        self.fd: IO[bytes]   None = None
        self.device: libevdev.Device   None = None
    def __enter__(self):
        self.fd = open(self.path, "rb")
        self.device = libevdev.Device(self.fd)
        return self
    def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb):
        self.device = None
        self.fd.close()
        self.fd = None
    def events(self) -> Iterator[dict[str, Any]]:
        for e in self.device.events():
            if e.type == libevdev.EV_KEY:
                if (val := KEY_MAP.get(e.code)):
                    yield  
                        "name": val,
                        "value": e.value,
                        "sec": e.sec,
                        "usec": e.usec,
Edited: added rules to handle the Bluetooth page turner

27 April 2023

Jonathan McDowell: Repurposing my C.H.I.P.

Way back at DebConf16 Gunnar managed to arrange for a number of Next Thing Co. C.H.I.P. boards to be distributed to those who were interested. I was lucky enough to be amongst those who received one, but I have to confess after some initial experimentation it ended up sitting in its box unused. The reasons for that were varied; partly about not being quite sure what best to do with it, partly due to a number of limitations it had, partly because NTC sadly went insolvent and there was less momentum around the hardware. I ve always meant to go back to it, poking it every now and then but never completing a project. I m finally almost there, and I figure I should write some of it up. TL;DR: My C.H.I.P. is currently running a mainline Linux 6.3 kernel with only a few DTS patches, an upstream u-boot v2022.1 with a couple of minor patches and an unmodified Debian bullseye armhf userspace.

Storage The main issue with the C.H.I.P. is that it uses MLC NAND, in particular mine has an 8MB H27QCG8T2E5R. That ended up unsupported in Linux, with the UBIFS folk disallowing operation on MLC devices. There s been subsequent work to enable an SLC emulation mode which makes the device more reliable at the cost of losing capacity by pairing up writes/reads in cells (AFAICT). Some of this hit for the H27UCG8T2ETR in 5.16 kernels, but I definitely did some experimentation with 5.17 without having much success. I should maybe go back and try again, but I ended up going a different route. It turned out that BytePorter had documented how to add a microSD slot to the NTC C.H.I.P., using just a microSD to full SD card adapter. Every microSD card I buy seems to come with one of these, so I had plenty lying around to test with. I started with ensuring the kernel could see it ok (by modifying the device tree), but once that was all confirmed I went further and built a more modern u-boot that talked to the SD card, and defaulted to booting off it. That meant no more relying on the internal NAND at all! I do see some flakiness with the SD card, which is possibly down to the dodgy way it s hooked up (I should probably do a basic PCB layout with JLCPCB instead). That s mostly been mitigated by forcing it into 1-bit mode instead of 4-bit mode (I tried lowering the frequency too, but that didn t make a difference). The problem manifests as: 
sunxi-mmc 1c11000.mmc: data error, sending stop command
and then all storage access freezing (existing logins still work, if the program you re trying to run is in cache). I can t find a conclusive software solution to this; I m pretty sure it s the hardware, but I don t understand why the recovery doesn t generally work.

Random power offs After I had storage working I d see random hangs or power offs. It wasn t quite clear what was going on. So I started trying to work out how to find out the CPU temperature, in case it was overheating. It turns out the temperature sensor on the R8 is part of the touchscreen driver, and I d taken my usual approach of turning off all the drivers I didn t think I d need. Enabling it (CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_SUN4I) gave temperature readings and seemed to help somewhat with stability, though not completely. Next I ended up looking at the AXP209 PMIC. There were various scripts still installed (I d started out with the NTC Debian install and slowly upgraded it to bullseye while stripping away the obvious pieces I didn t need) and a start-up script called enable-no-limit. This turned out to not be running (some sort of expectation of i2c-dev being loaded and another failing check), but looking at the script and the data sheet revealed the issue. The AXP209 can cope with 3 power sources; an external DC source, a Li-battery, and finally a USB port. I was powering my board via the USB port, using a charger rated for 2A. It turns out that the AXP209 defaults to limiting USB current to 900mA, and that with wifi active and the CPU busy the C.H.I.P. can rise above that. At which point the AXP shuts everything down. Armed with that info I was able to understand what the power scripts were doing and which bit I needed - i2cset -f -y 0 0x34 0x30 0x03 to set no limit and disable the auto-power off. Additionally I also discovered that the AXP209 had a built in temperature sensor as well, so I added support for that via iio-hwmon.

WiFi WiFi on the C.H.I.P. is provided by an RTL8723BS SDIO attached device. It s terrible (and not just here, I had an x86 based device with one where it also sucked). Thankfully there s a driver in staging in the kernel these days, but I ve still found it can fall out with my house setup, end up connecting to a further away AP which then results in lots of retries, dropped frames and CPU consumption. Nailing it to the AP on the other side of the wall from where it is helps. I haven t done any serious testing with the Bluetooth other than checking it s detected and can scan ok.

Patches I patched u-boot v2022.01 (which shows you how long ago I was trying this out) with the following to enable boot from external SD:
u-boot C.H.I.P. external SD patch 
diff --git a/arch/arm/dts/sun5i-r8-chip.dts b/arch/arm/dts/sun5i-r8-chip.dts
index 879a4b0f3b..1cb3a754d6 100644
--- a/arch/arm/dts/sun5i-r8-chip.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/dts/sun5i-r8-chip.dts
@@ -84,6 +84,13 @@
 		reset-gpios = <&pio 2 19 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>; /* PC19 */
 	 ;
 
+	mmc2_pins_e: mmc2@0  
+		pins = "PE4", "PE5", "PE6", "PE7", "PE8", "PE9";
+		function = "mmc2";
+		drive-strength = <30>;
+		bias-pull-up;
+	 ;
+
 	onewire  
 		compatible = "w1-gpio";
 		gpios = <&pio 3 2 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>; /* PD2 */
@@ -175,6 +182,16 @@
 	status = "okay";
  ;
 
+&mmc2  
+	pinctrl-names = "default";
+	pinctrl-0 = <&mmc2_pins_e>;
+	vmmc-supply = <&reg_vcc3v3>;
+	vqmmc-supply = <&reg_vcc3v3>;
+	bus-width = <4>;
+	broken-cd;
+	status = "okay";
+ ;
+
 &ohci0  
 	status = "okay";
  ;
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/arch-sunxi/gpio.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/arch-sunxi/gpio.h
index f3ab1aea0e..c0dfd85a6c 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/arch-sunxi/gpio.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/arch-sunxi/gpio.h
@@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ enum sunxi_gpio_number  
 
 #define SUN8I_GPE_TWI2		3
 #define SUN50I_GPE_TWI2		3
+#define SUNXI_GPE_SDC2		4
 
 #define SUNXI_GPF_SDC0		2
 #define SUNXI_GPF_UART0		4
diff --git a/board/sunxi/board.c b/board/sunxi/board.c
index fdbcd40269..f538cb7e20 100644
--- a/board/sunxi/board.c
+++ b/board/sunxi/board.c
@@ -433,9 +433,9 @@ static void mmc_pinmux_setup(int sdc)
 			sunxi_gpio_set_drv(pin, 2);
 		 
 #elif defined(CONFIG_MACH_SUN5I)
-		/* SDC2: PC6-PC15 */
-		for (pin = SUNXI_GPC(6); pin <= SUNXI_GPC(15); pin++)  
-			sunxi_gpio_set_cfgpin(pin, SUNXI_GPC_SDC2);
+		/* SDC2: PE4-PE9 */
+		for (pin = SUNXI_GPE(4); pin <= SUNXI_GPE(9); pin++)  
+			sunxi_gpio_set_cfgpin(pin, SUNXI_GPE_SDC2);
 			sunxi_gpio_set_pull(pin, SUNXI_GPIO_PULL_UP);
 			sunxi_gpio_set_drv(pin, 2);

I ve sent some patches for the kernel device tree upstream - there s an outstanding issue with the Bluetooth wake GPIO causing the serial port not to probe(!) that I need to resolve before sending a v2, but what s there works for me. The only remaining piece is patch to enable the external SD for Linux; I don t think it s appropriate to send upstream but it s fairly basic. This limits the bus to 1 bit rather than the 4 bits it s capable of, as mentioned above.
Linux C.H.I.P. external SD DTS patch diff diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/sun5i-r8-chip.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/sun5i-r8-chip.dts index fd37bd1f3920..2b5aa4952620 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/sun5i-r8-chip.dts +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/sun5i-r8-chip.dts @@ -163,6 +163,17 @@ &mmc0 status = "okay"; ; +&mmc2 + pinctrl-names = "default"; + pinctrl-0 = <&mmc2_4bit_pe_pins>; + vmmc-supply = <&reg_vcc3v3>; + vqmmc-supply = <&reg_vcc3v3>; + bus-width = <1>; + non-removable; + disable-wp; + status = "okay"; + ; + &ohci0 status = "okay"; ;

As for what I m doing with it, I think that ll have to be a separate post.

Simon Josefsson: A Security Device Threat Model: The Substitution Attack

I d like to describe and discuss a threat model for computational devices. This is generic but we will narrow it down to security-related devices. For example, portable hardware dongles used for OpenPGP/OpenSSH keys, FIDO/U2F, OATH HOTP/TOTP, PIV, payment cards, wallets etc and more permanently attached devices like a Hardware Security Module (HSM), a TPM-chip, or the hybrid variant of a mostly permanently-inserted but removable hardware security dongles. Our context is cryptographic hardware engineering, and the purpose of the threat model is to serve as as a thought experiment for how to build and design security devices that offer better protection. The threat model is related to the Evil maid attack. Our focus is to improve security for the end-user rather than the traditional focus to improve security for the organization that provides the token to the end-user, or to improve security for the site that the end-user is authenticating to. This is a critical but often under-appreciated distinction, and leads to surprising recommendations related to onboard key generation, randomness etc below.

The Substitution Attack
An attacker is able to substitute any component of the device (hardware or software) at any time for any period of time.
Your takeaway should be that devices should be designed to mitigate harmful consequences if any component of the device (hardware or software) is substituted for a malicious component for some period of time, at any time, during the lifespan of that component. Some designs protect better against this attack than other designs, and the threat model can be used to understand which designs are really bad, and which are less so.

Terminology The threat model involves at least one device that is well-behaving and one that is not, and we call these Good Device and Bad Device respectively. The bad device may be the same physical device as the good key, but with some minor software modification or a minor component replaced, but could also be a completely separate physical device. We don t care about that distinction, we just care if a particular device has a malicious component in it or not. I ll use terms like security device , device , hardware key , security co-processor etc interchangeably. From an engineering point of view, malicious here includes unintentional behavior such as software or hardware bugs. It is not possible to differentiate an intentionally malicious device from a well-designed device with a critical bug. Don t attribute to malice what can be adequately explained by stupidity, but don t na vely attribute to stupidity what may be deniable malicious.

What is some period of time ? Some period of time can be any length of time: seconds, minutes, days, weeks, etc. It may also occur at any time: During manufacturing, during transportation to the user, after first usage by the user, or after a couple of months usage by the user. Note that we intentionally consider time-of-manufacturing as a vulnerable phase. Even further, the substitution may occur multiple times. So the Good Key may be replaced with a Bad Key by the attacker for one day, then returned, and later this repeats a month later.

What is harmful consequences ? Since a security key has a fairly well-confined scope and purpose, we can get a fairly good exhaustive list of things that could go wrong. Harmful consequences include:
  • Attacker learns any secret keys stored on a Good Key.
  • Attacker causes user to trust a public generated by a Bad Key.
  • Attacker is able to sign something using a Good Key.
  • Attacker learns the PIN code used to unlock a Good Key.
  • Attacker learns data that is decrypted by a Good Key.

Thin vs Deep solutions One approach to mitigate many issues arising from device substitution is to have the host (or remote site) require that the device prove that it is the intended unique device before it continues to talk to it. This require an authentication/authorization protocol, which usually involves unique device identity and out-of-band trust anchors. Such trust anchors is often problematic, since a common use-case for security device is to connect it to a host that has never seen the device before. A weaker approach is to have the device prove that it merely belongs to a class of genuine devices from a trusted manufacturer, usually by providing a signature generated by a device-specific private key signed by the device manufacturer. This is weaker since then the user cannot differentiate two different good devices. In both cases, the host (or remote site) would stop talking to the device if it cannot prove that it is the intended key, or at least belongs to a class of known trusted genuine devices. Upon scrutiny, this solution is still vulnerable to a substitution attack, just earlier in the manufacturing chain: how can the process that injects the per-device or per-class identities/secrets know that it is putting them into a good key rather than a malicious device? Consider also the consequences if the cryptographic keys that guarantee that a device is genuine leaks. The model of the thin solution is similar to the old approach to network firewalls: have a filtering firewall that only lets through intended traffic, and then run completely insecure protocols internally such as telnet. The networking world has evolved, and now we have defense in depth: even within strongly firewall ed networks, it is prudent to run for example SSH with publickey-based user authentication even on locally physical trusted networks. This approach requires more thought and adds complexity, since each level has to provide some security checking. I m arguing we need similar defense-in-depth for security devices. Security key designs cannot simply dodge this problem by assuming it is working in a friendly environment where component substitution never occur.

Example: Device authentication using PIN codes To see how this threat model can be applied to reason about security key designs, let s consider a common design. Many security keys uses PIN codes to unlock private key operations, for example on OpenPGP cards that lacks built-in PIN-entry functionality. The software on the computer just sends a PIN code to the device, and the device allows private-key operations if the PIN code was correct. Let s apply the substitution threat model to this design: the attacker replaces the intended good key with a malicious device that saves a copy of the PIN code presented to it, and then gives out error messages. Once the user has entered the PIN code and gotten an error message, presumably temporarily giving up and doing other things, the attacker replaces the device back again. The attacker has learnt the PIN code, and can later use this to perform private-key operations on the good device. This means a good design involves not sending PIN codes in clear, but use a stronger authentication protocol that allows the card to know that the PIN was correct without learning the PIN. This is implemented optionally for many OpenPGP cards today as the key-derivation-function extension. That should be mandatory, and users should not use setups that sends device authentication in the clear, and ultimately security devices should not even include support for that. Compare how I build Gnuk on my PGP card with the kdf_do=required option.

Example: Onboard non-predictable key-generation Many devices offer both onboard key-generation, for example OpenPGP cards that generate a Ed25519 key internally on the devices, or externally where the device imports an externally generated cryptographic key. Let s apply the subsitution threat model to this design: the user wishes to generate a key and trust the public key that came out of that process. The attacker substitutes the device for a malicious device during key-generation, imports the private key into a good device and gives that back to the user. Most of the time except during key generation the user uses a good device but still the attacker succeeded in having the user trust a public key which the attacker knows the private key for. The substitution may be a software modification, and the method to leak the private key to the attacker may be out-of-band signalling. This means a good design never generates key on-board, but imports them from a user-controllable environment. That approach should be mandatory, and users should not use setups that generates private keys on-board, and ultimately security devices should not even include support for that.

Example: Non-predictable randomness-generation Many devices claims to generate random data, often with elaborate design documents explaining how good the randomness is. Let s apply the substitution threat model to this design: the attacker replaces the intended good key with a malicious design that generates (for the attacker) predictable randomness. The user will never be able to detect the difference since the random output is, well, random, and typically not distinguishable from weak randomness. The user cannot know if any cryptographic keys generated by a generator was faulty or not. This means a good design never generates non-predictable randomness on the device. That approach should be mandatory, and users should not use setups that generates non-predictable randomness on the device, and ideally devices should not have this functionality.

Case-Study: Tillitis I have warmed up a bit for this. Tillitis is a new security device with interesting properties, and core to its operation is the Compound Device Identifier (CDI), essentially your Ed25519 private key (used for SSH etc) is derived from the CDI that is computed like this:
cdi = blake2s(UDS, blake2s(device_app), USS)
Let s apply the substitution threat model to this design: Consider someone replacing the Tillitis key with a malicious key during postal delivery of the key to the user, and the replacement device is identical with the real Tillitis key but implements the following key derivation function:
cdi = weakprng(UDS , weakprng(device_app), USS)
Where weakprng is a compromised algorithm that is predictable for the attacker, but still appears random. Everything will work correctly, but the attacker will be able to learn the secrets used by the user, and the user will typically not be able to tell the difference since the CDI is secret and the Ed25519 public key is not self-verifiable.

Conclusion Remember that it is impossible to fully protect against this attack, that s why it is merely a thought experiment, intended to be used during design of these devices. Consider an attacker that never gives you access to a good key and as a user you only ever use a malicious device. There is no way to have good security in this situation. This is not hypothetical, many well-funded organizations do what they can to derive people from having access to trustworthy security devices. Philosophically it does not seem possible to tell if these organizations have succeeded 100% already and there are only bad security devices around where further resistance is futile, but to end on an optimistic note let s assume that there is a non-negligible chance that they haven t succeeded. In these situations, this threat model becomes useful to improve the situation by identifying less good designs, and that s why the design mantra of mitigate harmful consequences is crucial as a takeaway from this. Let s improve the design of security devices that further the security of its users!

18 April 2023

Matthew Palmer: Rutie and Magnus, Two Good Ways to Build Ruby Extensions in Rust

I wrote the Ruby bindings for the Enquo Project, my attempt to bring queryable encryption to all databases, using the Rutie library. Recently, I ve rewritten the bindings to use Magnus instead, and I thought I d put down my thoughts about the whole situation.

The Story So Far The Enquo Project core cryptography is all written in Rust, as seems to be the vogue these days. Rust is fast, safe, and easily interoperable with most of the rest of the modern software development ecosystem, making it a good choice as a language to implement the cryptographic primitives that Enquo needs, like Order-Revealing Encryption. Of course, since not everyone writes their applications in Rust, we need to provide the functionality of the Enquo client in the languages that people do use, such as Ruby, Python, and so on. Since re-writing all that cryptographic code in a myriad of languages would be tedious and error-prone, we instead provide bindings to the core Rust code. These are just thin shims of code that translate the data types and function calls between Rust and the target language.
Shim in a Can Wrong sort of shim, but canned language bindings would be handy
As I m most familiar with Ruby and its development ecosystem (particularly Ruby on Rails), it was natural that I d make Ruby bindings for Enquo as my first target. Rummaging around, it seemed that Rutie was a good library to use, so off I went.

What are Rutie and Magnus, Anyway? Both libraries share the same goal: provide the ability to write some Rust code, run that through a compiler, and produce something that can be loaded by the Ruby interpreter and used just like any other Ruby class. They re both fairly high level interfaces, trying to abstract away much of the gory details, and do a lot of the common heavy lifting that can make writing bindings fiddly and annoying. Things like mapping data types (like strings and integers) between Rust data types and the closest equivalents in Ruby. This mapping never goes perfectly smoothly. For example, Ruby integers don t have a fixed range of values they can represent you can store a huge number like 2256 more-or-less as easily as you can the number 12. But Rust, being a lower-level language, only has a set of integer types that have fixed boundaries, like the u32 type, which can only store integers between zero and about four billion (232 - 1, to be precise). There s also lots of little things that need to be just right, also, like translating the different memory management approaches of the languages, and dealing with a myriad of fiddly little issues like passing arguments and return values in and out of method calls, helpers for defining classes and methods (and pointing to the correct Rust functions), and so on.
A mass of tangled pipes and valves This is what I imagine it looks like inside these libraries
(Herv Cozanet / Wikimedia Commons, CC-BY-SA)
All in all, these libraries are fairly significant pieces of work, and I m mighty glad that someone else has taken on the job of building (and maintaining!) them.

So Why the Change? Good question. It s important to say at the outset that there s nothing particularly wrong with Rutie. I found using Rutie to be very straightforward, and the Ruby bindings came together very quickly and easily. If someone chose to use Rutie for their project, I m sure they d have a good experience. What made me take the time to rewrite using Magnus was a set of a few tiny things, which together gave me enough of a shove to do the work. Firstly, I d had a hiccup with Rutie s support of newer versions of Ruby, particularly 3.2 (PR). Also, I d hit a couple of segfault issues, which were ultimately caused by Ruby garbage-collecting data out from underneath me. These were ultimately my fault, of course, but Rutie wasn t helping me out in avoiding the problems in the first place. Finally, while Rutie helped translate data types, there was still a bit of boilerplate and ugliness that needed to be included. This wasn t a showstopper, but I m appreciating the extra smoothness that Magnus provides here. As an example, here s what s required in Rutie to get native Rust data types from Ruby method parameters (and the self reference to the current object): 
fn enquo_field_decrypt_text(ciphertext_obj: RString, context_obj: RString) -> RString  
    let ciphertext = ciphertext_obj.to_str_unchecked();
    let context = context_obj.to_vec_u8_unchecked();
    let field = rbself.get_data(&*FIELD_WRAPPER);
    // etc etc etc
The equivalent in Magnus is just the function signature: 
fn decrypt_text(&self, ciphertext: String, context: String) -> Result<String, magnus::Error>
You can also see there that Magnus signals an exception via the Result return value, while Rutie s approach to raising an exception involves poking the Ruby VM directly, which always struck me as a bit ugly. There are several other minor things in Magnus (like its cleaner approach to wrapping structs so they can be stored in Ruby objects) that I m appreciating, too. Never discount the power of ergonomics for making a happy developer.

The End Result I spent a bit over half of last weekend doing the rewrite maybe ten hours of so. Since Magnus did more type checking and data validation, and its approach to error handling was smoother, I took the opportunity to rewrite a bunch of Ruby wrapper code I d written (which just existed to check things like ranges of values and string encodings) into Rust, as well. To make sure that the conversion was accurate, I added a heap more unit tests to the bindings. I also took the opportunity to restructure the codebase to split the code for the different Ruby classes into separate files, which I hadn t done initially as the code had originally accreted, rather than being purposefully written. All up, though, my rewrite ended up removing over 60 lines (excluding the extra specs I added): 
$ git diff --stat -- lib ext/enquo/src
 ruby/ext/enquo/src/field.rs         342 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 ruby/ext/enquo/src/lib.rs           338 ++++---------------------------------
 ruby/ext/enquo/src/root.rs           39 +++++
 ruby/ext/enquo/src/root_key.rs       67 ++++++++
 ruby/lib/enquo.rb                     6 +-
 ruby/lib/enquo/field.rb             173 -------------------
 ruby/lib/enquo/root.rb               28 ----
 ruby/lib/enquo/root_key.rb            1 -
 ruby/lib/enquo/root_key/static.rb    27 ---
 9 files changed, 479 insertions(+), 542 deletions(-)
Considering that I was translating from a higher level language into a lower level one, the removal of so much code is quite remarkable. Magnus was able to automagically replace rather a lot of raise ArgumentError if something.isnt_right code in those .rb files. So, in conclusion, if you, too, are building Ruby extensions in Rust, while Rutie is a solid choice (and you probably should stick with it if you re already using it), I highly recommend giving Magnus a look for your next extension.

10 April 2023

Russell Coker: BTRFS Rebuild Time

In February I replaced a Dell T320 server with a HP Z640 workstation for a home server/workstation [1]. The T320 has 8*3.5 drive bays which I had used to put 3*4TB disks in a BTRFS RAID-10 array for 6TB of usable capacity. The Z640 has only 2*3.5 bays and 4*2.5 bays, so one option I could have taken was to buy a 4TB 2.5 SSD and keep the same 3*4TB array as before. Instead I chose to use an 8TB disk I had spare in an array with one of the original 4TB disks and some extra on NVMe devices (the system has 2*1TB NVMe devices which are used as a 380G RAID-1 for the root filesystem and the rest for the storage array). It s nice how BTRFS allows putting any storage you have in a RAID-10 configuration. Unfortunately it seems that I chose the wrong 4TB disk to use for this as it failed three days ago. It gave thousands of read and write errors and Linux decided that the drive no longer existed. I tried rebooting the system to get it in the BTRFS array again but it failed again and failed so quickly that it wasn t even possible to use the data on it as part of a RAID rebuild. So I removed that disk and put in one of the other 4TB disks. As the array is comprised of an 8TB disk and 3 other devices that don t add up to 8TB the layout is the 8TB disk having one copy of everything and the other devices having parts of it. So the rebuild process comprised of copying data from the 8TB disk to the 4TB disk. For a RAID array run in the manner of Linux software RAID the rebuild of a RAID-1 involves a linear copy of data which is the optimal case for hard disks, copying 4TB of data in that manner would have an average speed of a bit over 100MB/s and take about 11 hours. With BTRFS the source disk has to be updated for each block that is recreated so the process was bottlenecked on writing to the 8TB disk. It took 2 days 23 hours to complete. The process involved reading 3,478,031MB and writing 4,405,545MB. The system was live for the process and some cron jobs etc were writing to the array, but in the 12 hours since the rebuild completed the array has had 7,038MB written. So presumably during the rebuild time about 42G of actual data were written to the array and the other 4.3TB written to the 8TB disk were from the process of copying 3.5TB from it to another device. Iostat reported that there were 645.36 TPS for the duration of the rebuild which seems like a decent number for a hard drive, during the process iostat reported that the drive had 99%+ of IO capacity used for the duration. While waiting for this to complete I wrote a blog post about storage trends [2]. One thing I didn t mention in that post is that if you are the type of person who checks the rebuild process fifty times a day then that should be counted as part of the cost of using slow storage. If instead of an 8TB disk plus some SSD storage I had used 2*4TB disks and 1*4TB SSD as I had considered doing then instead of having 3.8TB on one device I would have had about 2.5TB and the reconstruct would have probably taken 2/3 of the time. If I had moved the array to 3*4TB SSDs then it would have taken a small fraction of the time. One thing to note is that I made a mistake in this operation by removing the failed device instead of doing a btrfs replace operation which can be significantly faster. If I had correctly done this then I would have written a blog post about the rebuild taking 2 days or something, the issues of hard drives being slow and me compulsively checking the progress would still apply.
Related posts:
  1. BTRFS vs LVM For some years LVM (the Linux Logical Volume Manager) has...
  2. RAID Pain One of my clients has a NAS device. Last week...
  3. BTRFS Status Dec 2014 My last problem with BTRFS was in August [1]. BTRFS...

8 April 2023

Russell Coker: Storage Trends 2023

It s been 2 years since my last blog post about storage trends [1]. Minimum Storage <=2TB In 2021 I stated that as MSY had 2TB disks for $72 and 2TB SSD for $245 it was barely worth considering a 2TB disk and anything less than 2TB wasn t worth considering. Now for 2TB storage from MSY NVMe starts at $129, SATA SSD starts at $143, and hard disks start at $75. I guess that NVMe is slightly cheaper due to some combination of economies of scale for manufacture/sales and having less postage costs. It really doesn t make sense to consider hard disks for storing 2TB or less. For storage for a small system (PC or laptop) the cheapest storage device is $19 for a 128G SATA SSD. But it wouldn t make sense to buy that when you can get a 256G SATA SSD for $22 or a 240G NVMe device for $23, saving $3 on storage wouldn t make any sense. For 512G of storage the prices are $32 for NVMe and $33 for SATA SSD. For 1TB of storage the prices start at $68 for SATA SSD and $74 for NVMe. Probably for the vast majority of home users 1TB of SATA SSD or NVMe is the minimum storage capacity to consider, the $50 price difference isn t much when considering the entire price of a PC or laptop and anything less than 1TB will run out quickly with modern use. Larger Storage 4TB+ The price for 4TB of storage from MSY is NVMe starting at $349, SATA SSD starting at $369, and hard disks starting at $115. If you need 4TB of RAID-1 storage then it might be worth saving $470 and getting hard drives for a home user. For business use it wouldn t make sense. Some laptops have two NVMe sockets so 8TB of storage (or 4TB of RAID-1) in a laptop would be interesting. For 8TB of storage the MSY prices are SATA SSD for $739 and hard drives starting at $179. Probably hard drives are the best choice for most situations where there is a need to store 8TB or more of data. But the prices are low enough to make 8TB SSD something that can be considered for home use, it doesn t seem that long ago that the 4TB hard drives I bought for my home server were almost that expensive. Big Storage MSY doesn t have 8TB NVMe, such devices are on eBay for $1700 for regular M.2 NVMe and just under $1000 for U.2 (server hot-swap devices). So if you need more than 8TB of NVMe storage then probably buying a server with U.2 built in is the correct solution. For home users who need more than 8TB of storage hard drives are a good solution. One issue is that the more affordable and larger drives use Shingled Magnetic Recording (SMR) which has some different performance characteristics for certain workloads. Apparently SMR performs badly for anything other than large file storage. Why MSY? I primarily used MSY prices for this post because they are a reliable local store that has a list of prices that is easy to read. For everything in this post I can get better prices by using eBay, the StaticIce.com.au price comparison site [2], and the computing section of the OzBargain site that gamifies finding good prices [3]. But a good shopping strategy nowadays is to compare prices in a store to determine what items are in your price range and then shop around for price on the item you want. Checking all the different bargain sites for all these items would take much more time than I want to spend writing a blog post! Conclusion Hard drives don t make sense for the vast majority of systems. Not for laptops, not for typical desktop PCs, and not for small business servers (say 8TB or less of RAID storage). Hard drives only make sense for dozens or hundreds of TB of storage and even then finding out how to deal with SMR issues is going to increase the pain of deployment. Maybe using a combination of SSD and hard drives to deal with the SMR issues is going to be a competitive advantage for NAS vendors in future. NVMe looks like it s on the way to being cheaper than SATA SSD. There is likely to be a good market for systems with NVMe as the only internal storage option. The long term trend of systems without DVD drives and with maybe 2.5 SATA devices but no 3.5 SATA devices seems to lead to the GPU being the major part that needs to fit into a PC case that determines the overall size. Maybe there will be a new trend of GPUs connected to riser cards so they can be parallel to the motherboard for compact PCs. For business desktop systems (IE low powered graphics hardware as it s not for gaming) I expect that the trend will be towards NUC type devices which are already based around the M.2 as a storage device size.
Related posts:
  1. Storage Trends 2021 The Viability of Small Disks Less than a year ago...
  2. Storage Trends In considering storage trends for the consumer side I m looking...
  3. New Storage Developments Eweek has an article on a new 1TB Seagate drive....

6 April 2023

Reproducible Builds: Reproducible Builds in March 2023

Welcome to the March 2023 report from the Reproducible Builds project. In these reports we outline the most important things that we have been up to over the past month. As a quick recap, the motivation behind the reproducible builds effort is to ensure no malicious flaws have been introduced during compilation and distributing processes. It does this by ensuring identical results are always generated from a given source, thus allowing multiple third-parties to come to a consensus on whether a build was compromised. If you are interested in contributing to the project, please do visit our Contribute page on our website.

News There was progress towards making the Go programming language reproducible this month, with the overall goal remaining making the Go binaries distributed from Google and by Arch Linux (and others) to be bit-for-bit identical. These changes could become part of the upcoming version 1.21 release of Go. An issue in the Go issue tracker (#57120) is being used to follow and record progress on this.
Arnout Engelen updated our website to add and update reproducibility-related links for NixOS to reproducible.nixos.org. [ ]. In addition, Chris Lamb made some cosmetic changes to our presentations and resources page. [ ][ ]
Intel published a guide on how to reproducibly build their Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) firmware. TDX here refers to an Intel technology that combines their existing virtual machine and memory encryption technology with a new kind of virtual machine guest called a Trust Domain. This runs the CPU in a mode that protects the confidentiality of its memory contents and its state from any other software.
A reproducibility-related bug from early 2020 in the GNU GCC compiler as been fixed. The issues was that if GCC was invoked via the as frontend, the -ffile-prefix-map was being ignored. We were tracking this in Debian via the build_path_captured_in_assembly_objects issue. It has now been fixed and will be reflected in GCC version 13.
Holger Levsen will present at foss-north 2023 in April of this year in Gothenburg, Sweden on the topic of Reproducible Builds, the first ten years.
Anthony Andreoli, Anis Lounis, Mourad Debbabi and Aiman Hanna of the Security Research Centre at Concordia University, Montreal published a paper this month entitled On the prevalence of software supply chain attacks: Empirical study and investigative framework:
Software Supply Chain Attacks (SSCAs) typically compromise hosts through trusted but infected software. The intent of this paper is twofold: First, we present an empirical study of the most prominent software supply chain attacks and their characteristics. Second, we propose an investigative framework for identifying, expressing, and evaluating characteristic behaviours of newfound attacks for mitigation and future defense purposes. We hypothesize that these behaviours are statistically malicious, existed in the past, and thus could have been thwarted in modernity through their cementation x-years ago. [ ]

On our mailing list this month:
  • Mattia Rizzolo is asking everyone in the community to save the date for the 2023 s Reproducible Builds summit which will take place between October 31st and November 2nd at Dock Europe in Hamburg, Germany. Separate announcement(s) to follow. [ ]
  • ahojlm posted an message announcing a new project which is the first project offering bootstrappable and verifiable builds without any binary seeds. That is to say, a way of providing a verifiable path towards trusted software development platform without relying on pre-provided binary code in order to prevent against various forms of compiler backdoors. The project s homepage is hosted on Tor (mirror).

The minutes and logs from our March 2023 IRC meeting have been published. In case you missed this one, our next IRC meeting will take place on Tuesday 25th April at 15:00 UTC on #reproducible-builds on the OFTC network.
and as a Valentines Day present, Holger Levsen wrote on his blog on 14th February to express his thanks to OSUOSL for their continuous support of reproducible-builds.org. [ ]

Debian Vagrant Cascadian developed an easier setup for testing debian packages which uses sbuild s unshare mode along and reprotest, our tool for building the same source code twice in different environments and then checking the binaries produced by each build for any differences. [ ]
Over 30 reviews of Debian packages were added, 14 were updated and 7 were removed this month, all adding to our knowledge about identified issues. A number of issues were updated, including the Holger Levsen updating build_path_captured_in_assembly_objects to note that it has been fixed for GCC 13 [ ] and Vagrant Cascadian added new issues to mark packages where the build path is being captured via the Rust toolchain [ ] as well as new categorisation for where virtual packages have nondeterministic versioned dependencies [ ].

Upstream patches The Reproducible Builds project detects, dissects and attempts to fix as many currently-unreproducible packages as possible. We endeavour to send all of our patches upstream where appropriate. This month, we wrote a large number of such patches, including: In addition, Vagrant Cascadian filed a bug with a patch to ensure GNU Modula-2 supports the SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH environment variable.

Testing framework The Reproducible Builds project operates a comprehensive testing framework (available at tests.reproducible-builds.org) in order to check packages and other artifacts for reproducibility. In March, the following changes were made by Holger Levsen:
  • Arch Linux-related changes:
    • Build Arch packages in /tmp/archlinux-ci/$SRCPACKAGE instead of /tmp/$SRCPACKAGE. [ ]
    • Start 2/3 of the builds on the o1 node, the rest on o2. [ ]
    • Add graphs for Arch Linux (and OpenWrt) builds. [ ]
    • Toggle Arch-related builders to debug why a specific node overloaded. [ ][ ][ ][ ]
  • Node health checks:
    • Detect SetuptoolsDeprecationWarning tracebacks in Python builds. [ ]
    • Detect failures do perform chdist calls. [ ][ ]
  • OSUOSL node migration.
    • Install megacli packages that are needed for hardware RAID. [ ][ ]
    • Add health check and maintenance jobs for new nodes. [ ]
    • Add mail config for new nodes. [ ][ ]
    • Handle a node running in the future correctly. [ ][ ]
    • Migrate some nodes to Debian bookworm. [ ]
    • Fix nodes health overview for osuosl3. [ ]
    • Make sure the /srv/workspace directory is owned by by the jenkins user. [ ]
    • Use .debian.net names everywhere, except when communicating with the outside world. [ ]
    • Grant fpierret access to a new node. [ ]
    • Update documentation. [ ]
    • Misc migration changes. [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ]
  • Misc changes:
    • Enable fail2ban everywhere and monitor it with munin [ ].
    • Gracefully deal with non-existing Alpine schroots. [ ]
In addition, Roland Clobus is continuing his work on reproducible Debian ISO images:
  • Add/update openQA configuration [ ], and use the actual timestamp for openQA builds [ ].
  • Moved adding the user to the docker group from the janitor_setup_worker script to the (more general) update_jdn.sh script. [ ]
  • Use the (short-term) reproducible source when generating live-build images. [ ]

diffoscope development diffoscope is our in-depth and content-aware diff utility. Not only can it locate and diagnose reproducibility issues, it can provide human-readable diffs from many kinds of binary formats as well. This month, Mattia Rizzolo released versions 238, and Chris Lamb released versions 239 and 240. Chris Lamb also made the following changes:
  • Fix compatibility with PyPDF 3.x, and correctly restore test data. [ ]
  • Rework PDF annotation handling into a separate method. [ ]
In addition, Holger Levsen performed a long-overdue overhaul of the Lintian overrides in the Debian packaging [ ][ ][ ][ ], and Mattia Rizzolo updated the packaging to silence an include_package_data=True [ ], fixed the build under Debian bullseye [ ], fixed tool name in a list of tools permitted to be absent during package build tests [ ] and as well as documented sending out an email upon [ ]. In addition, Vagrant Cascadian updated the version of GNU Guix to 238 [ and 239 [ ]. Vagrant also updated reprotest to version 0.7.23. [ ]

Other development work Bernhard M. Wiedemann published another monthly report about reproducibility within openSUSE

If you are interested in contributing to the Reproducible Builds project, please visit our Contribute page on our website. However, you can get in touch with us via:

25 March 2023

Gunnar Wolf: Now that we are talking about kernel building... What about firebuild?

After my last post, B lint (who prompted it with his last post) suggested I should do a hybrid test of his tests and my extremes. He suggested I should build the Linux kernel using my Raspberry Pi 4 (8GB model), but using the Firebuild build accelerator. Before going any further: I must make clear that while Firebuild is freely redistributable, it is not made available under a free license. It is free for personal use or commercial trial, but otherwise requires licensing. B lint managed to build a Linux kernel in just over 8 seconds. So, how did my test go? My previous experiment, using -j 4, built Linux in ~100 minutes; this was about a year ago, and I m now building linux 6.1, so I timed this again. To get a baseline, I built my kernel from a just-unpacked tree, just as usual: 
# cd /usr/src/linux-source-6.1
# make clean
# make defconfig
# time make -j4
(...)
real    117m30.588s
user    392m41.434s
sys     52m2.556s
Of course, having all of the object files built makes the rebuild process quite faster (this is still done without firebuild). I understand calling make defconfig without cleaning does not change much, but I saw it often referenced in firebuild s docs, so I m leaving it: 
# time make -j 4
(...)
real    0m43.822s
user    1m36.577s
sys     0m40.805s
Then, I did a first run using firebuild. Firebuild is a caching build optimizer, so the first run will naturally be somewhat slower (but if you often rebuild your kernel, it should be seen as an investment). Now, in the Raspberry Pi, that uses a slow SD card interface for its storage It is a heavy investment. The first time I built with firebuild, it meant almost a 100% build time hit: 
# cd /usr/src/linux-source-6.1
# make clean
# make defconfig
# time firebuild make -j 4
(...)
real    212m58.647s
user    391m49.080s
sys     81m10.758s
Not only that; I am using a fairly decent and big 32GB card, but this is quite a big price to pay in such a limited system! 
# du -sh .cache/firebuild/
4.2G    .cache/firebuild/
I did a build without cleaning the build directory, using firebuild, and it does help although not by so much as in higher performance systems: 
# cd /usr/src/linux-source-6.1
# make clean
# make defconfig
# time firebuild make -j 4
(...)
real    68m6.621s
user    98m32.514s
sys     31m41.643s
So, it built in roughly 65% of the time it would take to build regularly. And what about rebuilding without cleaning? 
# make defconfig
# time firebuild make -j 4
(...)
real    1m11.872s
user    2m5.807s
sys     1m46.178s
In this case, using firebuild worked roughly 30% slower than not using it. I guess the high number of file ops inside .cache/firebuild are to blame, as in the case of the media I m using, those are quite expensive; make went its way basically checking date stamps between *.c and *.o (yes, very roughly), and while running under firebuild, I suppose each of these meant an extra lookup inside the cache. So Experiment requested, experiment performed!

21 March 2023

B lint R czey: Building the Linux kernel in under 10 seconds with Firebuild

Russell published an interesting post about his first experience with Firebuild accelerating refpolicy s and the Linux kernel s build. It turned out a few small tweaks could accelerate the builds even more, crossing the 10 second barrier with Linux s build.
Build performance with 18 cores The Linux kernel s build time is a widely used benchmark for compilers, making it a prime candidate to test a build accelerator as well. In the first run on Russell s 18 core test system the observed user+sys CPU time was cut by 44% with an actual increase in wall clock time which was quite unusual. Firebuild performed much better than that in prior tests. To replicate the results I ve set up a clean Debian Bookworm VM on my machine: 
lxc launch images:debian/bookworm  vm -c limits.cpu=18 -c limits.memory=16GB bookworm-vm
Compiling Linux 6.1.10 in this clean Debian VM showed build times closer to what I expected to see, ~72% less wall clock time and ~97% less user+sys CPU time: 
$ make defconfig && time make bzImage -j18
real	1m31.157s
user	20m54.256s
sys	2m25.986s
$ make defconfig && time firebuild make bzImage -j18
# first run:
real	2m3.948s
user	21m28.845s
sys	4m16.526s
# second run
real	0m25.783s
user	0m56.618s
sys	0m21.622s
There are multiple differences between Russell s and my test system including having different CPUs (E5-2696v3 vs. virtualized Ryzen 5900X) and different file systems (BTRFS RAID-1 vs ext4), but I don t think those could explain the observed mismatch in performance. The difference may be worth further analysis, but let s get back to squeezing out more performance from Firebuild. Firebuild was developed on Ubuntu. I was wondering if Firebuild was faster there, but I got only slightly better build times in an identical VM running Ubuntu 22.10 (Kinetic Kudu): 
$ make defconfig && time make bzImage -j18
real	1m31.130s
user	20m52.930s
sys	2m12.294s
$ make defconfig && time firebuild make bzImage -j18
# first run:
real	2m3.274s
user	21m18.810s
sys	3m45.351s
# second run
real	0m25.532s
user	0m53.087s
sys	0m18.578s
The KVM virtualization certainly introduces an overhead, thus builds must be faster in LXC containers. Indeed, all builds are faster by a few percents: 
$ lxc launch ubuntu:kinetic kinetic-container
...
$ make defconfig && time make bzImage -j18
real	1m27.462s
user	20m25.190s
sys	2m13.014s
$ make defconfig && time firebuild make bzImage -j18
# first run:
real	1m53.253s
user	21m42.730s
sys	3m41.067s
# second run
real	0m24.702s
user	0m49.120s
sys	0m16.840s
# Cache size:    1.85 GB
Apparently this ~72% reduction in wall clock time is what one should expect by simply prefixing the build command with firebuild on a similar configuration, but we should not stop here. Firebuild does not accelerate quicker commands by default to save cache space. This howto suggests letting firebuild accelerate all commands including even "sh by passing "-o 'processes.skip_cache = []' to firebuild.
Accelerating all commands in this build s case increases cache size by only 9%, and increases the wall clock time saving to 91%, not only making the build more than 10X faster, but finishing it in less than 8 seconds, which may be a new world record!: 
$ make defconfig && time firebuild -o 'processes.skip_cache = []' make bzImage -j18
# first run:
real	1m54.937s
user	21m35.988s
sys	3m42.335s
# second run
real	0m7.861s
user	0m15.332s
sys	0m7.707s
# Cache size:    2.02 GB
There are even faster CPUs on the market than this 5900X. If you happen to have access to one please leave a comment if you could go below 5 seconds! Scaling to higher core counts and comparison with ccache Russell raised the very valid point about Firebuild s single threaded supervisor being a bottleneck on high core systems and comparison to ccache also came up in comments. Since ccache does not have a central supervisor it could scale better with more cores, but let s see if ccache could go below 10 seconds with the build times
firebuild -o processes.skip_cache = [] and ccache scaling to 24 cores
Well, no. The best time time for ccache is 18.81s, with -j24. Both firebuild and ccache keep gaining from extra cores up to 8 cores, but beyond that the wall clock time improvements diminish. The more interesting difference is that firebuild s user and sys time is basically constant from -j1 to -j24 similarly to ccache s user time, but ccache s sys time increases linearly or exponentially with the number of used cores. I suspect this is due to the many parallel ccache processes performing file operations to check if cache entries could be reused, while in firebuild s case the supervisor performs most of that work not requiring in-kernel synchronization across multiple cores. It is true, that the single threaded firebuild supervisor is a bottleneck, but the supervisor also implements a central filesystem cache, thus checking if a command s cache entry can be reused can be implemented with much fewer system calls and much less user space hashing making the architecture more efficient overall than ccache s. The beauty of Firebuild is not being faster than ccache, but being faster than ccache with basically no hard-coded information about how C compilers work. It can accelerate any other compiler or program that generates deterministic output from its input, just by observing what they did in their prior runs. It is like having ccache for every compiler including in-house developed ones, and also for random slow scripts.

7 March 2023

Jonathan Dowland: date warping in HLedger

My credit card and bank account rarely agree on the date for when I pay it off1. Since I added balance assertions for bank account transactions, I need the transaction in my ledger to match what the bank thinks, otherwise the balance assertions would start to fail. The skew is not normally more than a couple of days, and could be corrected by changing the date for just one of the two postings. But the skew is not very important, and altering the posting date could be used for something more useful. date warping credit card repayments My credit card bills land halfway through the month, so February's bill covers transactions between January 15th and February 14th. I pay off the bill in full each month using Direct Debit. The credit card company consider the bill paid immediately, but they don't actually draw it until the end of the month (Jan 31 in the running example). This means the payment transaction for a given month lands halfway through the period covered by the next month's bill. The credit card bill itself shows the payment date at the end of the month but presents the transaction "warped" right to the start. This is actually useful, because it means the balance is zero for the first purchase on the bill. The credit card data in CSV form has the repayment transaction at the date it occurred, not warped to the start of the period. When I import this into HLedger, the credit card account balance for each new transaction does not match the statement right up to the point of the repayment, half way through. This makes spot-checking that the imported data matches the statement a bit more awkward. So, I have started "warping" the payment transaction to the start of the billing period, just like the credit card statement does: 
2022-12-31  pay credit card
  asset:bank      -500
  liabilities:credit card  ;  date:2022-12-15
I can then spot-check the transactions in HLedger after import, in particular the final one, and the final account balance, and then write a manual balance assertion when I'm finished. I'd quite like to automate the adjusted posting date, too, but I haven't figured out how to do that just yet. date warping for refunds Another thing I've found "date warping" useful is for marrying up refunds with their related purchase. Imagine I spent 200 on some shoes in late January, but returned most of them in early February: 
2023-01-25  buy some shoes. hedging on the size
  liabilities:credit card      -200
  expenses:shoes
2023-02-05  return the ones that don't fit
  liabilities:credit card       150
  expenses:shoes
If I look at how much I've spent on shoes per month, it looks odd: 200 in January (although ultimately I only spent 50), and -150 in February. 
Balance changes in 2023-01-01..2023-02-28:
$ hledger bal -Mt expenses:shoes
                    Jan     Feb 
================++===============
 expenses:shoes     200    -150 
----------------++---------------
                    200    -150
By "warping" the refund's posting to the expense account to the purchase date, how much I ultimately spent on shoes is more properly reflected: 
2023-02-05  return the ones that don't fit
  liabilities:credit card       150
  expenses:shoes  ; date:2023-01-25
resulting in 
$ hledger bal -Mt expenses:shoes
Balance changes in 2023-01-01..2023-02-28:
                   Jan  Feb 
================++===========
 expenses:shoes     50    0 
----------------++-----------
                    50    0
I suppose whether you'd want to do this is a matter of taste.
  1. Amazon rarely agrees with my bank on when we've paid for things either. For other reasons, Amazon is a beast to tackle in another blog post.

25 February 2023

Petter Reinholdtsen: OpenSnitch available in Debian Sid and Bookworm

Thanks to the efforts of the OpenSnitch lead developer Gustavo I iguez Goya allowing me to sponsor the upload, the interactive application firewall OpenSnitch is now available in Debian Testing, soon to become the next stable release of Debian. This is a package which set up a network firewall on one or more machines, which is controlled by a graphical user interface that will ask the user if a program should be allowed to connect to the local network or the Internet. If some background daemon is trying to dial home, it can be blocked from doing so with a simple mouse click, or by default simply by not doing anything when the GUI question dialog pop up. A list of all programs discovered using the network is provided in the GUI, giving the user an overview of how the machine(s) programs use the network. OpenSnitch was uploaded for NEW processing about a month ago, and I had little hope of it getting accepted and shaping up in time for the package freeze, but the Debian ftpmasters proved to be amazingly quick at checking out the package and it was accepted into the archive about week after the first upload. It is now team maintained under the Go language team umbrella. A few fixes to the default setup is only in Sid, and should migrate to Testing/Bookworm in a week. During testing I ran into an issue with Minecraft server broadcasts disappearing, which was quickly resolved by the developer with a patch and a proposed configuration change. I've been told this was caused by the Debian packages default use if /proc/ information to track down kernel status, instead of the newer eBPF module that can be used. The reason is simply that upstream and I have failed to find a way to build the eBPF modules for OpenSnitch without a complete configured Linux kernel source tree, which as far as we can tell is unavailable as a build dependency in Debian. We tried unsuccessfully so far to use the kernel-headers package. It would be great if someone could provide some clues how to build eBPF modules on build daemons in Debian, possibly without the full kernel source. As usual, if you use Bitcoin and want to show your support of my activities, please send Bitcoin donations to my address 15oWEoG9dUPovwmUL9KWAnYRtNJEkP1u1b.

17 February 2023

Enrico Zini: Monitoring a heart rate monitor

I bought myself a cheap wearable Bluetooth LE heart rate monitor in order to play with it, and this is a simple Python script to monitor it and plot data. Bluetooth LE I was surprised that these things seem decently interoperable. You can use hcitool to scan for devices: 
hcitool lescan
You can then use gatttool to connect to device and poke at them interactively from a command line. Bluetooth LE from Python There is a nice library called Bleak which is also packaged in Debian. It's modern Python with asyncio and works beautifully! Heart rate monitors Things I learnt: How about a proper fitness tracker? I found OpenTracks, also on F-Droid, which seems nice Why script it from a desktop computer? The question is: why not? A fitness tracker on a phone is useful, but there are lots of silly things one can do from one's computer that one can't do from a phone. A heart rate monitor is, after all, one more input device, and there are never enough input devices! There are so many extremely important use cases that seem entirely unexplored:

15 February 2023

Valhalla's Things: My experience with a PinePhone

Posted on February 15, 2023
I ve had and used1 a PinePhone for quite some time now, and a shiny new blog sounds like a good time to do a review of my experience. TL;DL: I love it, but my use cases may not be very typical. While I ve had a mobile phone since an early time (my parents made me carry one for emergencies before it was usual for my peers) I ve never used a typical smartphone (android / iPhone / those other proprietary things) because I can t trust them not to be designed to work against me (data collection, ads, tricking users into micro payments, and other antipatterns of proprietary software design), and bringing them to sanity as most of the people I know do is too much effort for my tastes. Instead, as a phone I keep using an old nokia featurephone2 which is reliable, only requires charging once a week, and can easily survive falling from hand height to the ground, even if thrown 3. And then I ve been carrying a variety of other devices to do other computer-like tasks; earlier it was just a laptop, or a netbook, a Pandora (all of which used a dongle to connect to mobile network internet) then I tried a phone with FirefoxOS (it could have been better) and now the PinePhone has taken their place, at least when I m not carrying a laptop anyway. So, the tasks I use the PinePhone for are mostly:
  1. sending and receiving xmpp messages, with no need for notifications (when somebody needs to tell me something where urgency is required, they know to use the other phone, either with a call or an sms);
  2. tethering an internet connection to the laptop;
  3. reading djvu scans of old books while standing in a queue or something;
  4. checking something on the internet when I m not close to a real computer (i.e. one with a keyboard and a big screen);
  5. running a timer while heat-setting fabric paint with an iron (and reading a djvu book at the same time yes, this is a very specific task, but it has happened multiple times already :D );
  6. running a calculator with unit conversions;
  7. running the odd command line program;
  8. taking pictures, especially those that I want to send soon (I often also carry a DSLR camera, but I tend to wait a few days before I download them from the card);
  9. map related things.
3 and 5 work perfectly well, no issues there. 1, 2 and 4 usually work just fine, except for the fact that sometimes while the phone is suspended it forgets about being a phone, and needs to be restarted to turn the modem back on. It s not a big deal while using the phone, I just need to check before I try to use it after a few hours. For 1, I also had to take care to install dino-im from experimental, as up to now the features required to fit the interface in a mobile screen aren t available in the official release, but I believe that this has just been fixed. Somewhat related to 4, I ve also installed kiwix and the dumps of wiktionary and wikivoyage, but I haven t had a chance to travel much, so I m not really using it. For 6 I m quite happy with qalculate, the GUI version of qalc (which is what I use on my laptop), even if it has a few minor interface issues, and 7 of course works as well as it can, given the limitations of a small screen and virtual keyboard. 8 is, let us say, problematic. The camera on the PinePhone is peculiar, only works with a specific software, and even there the quality of the pictures is, well, low-fi, vintagey pictures are a look and that s a specific artistic choice, right? Thanks to the hard work of the megapixels maintainer the quality has improved a lot, and these days it is usable, but there are still limits (no webcam in the browser, no recording of videos). 9 is really bad. A few times I can remember getting a GPS fix. A few times in many months, and now and then I keep trying, to see if a miracle has happened, but usually I only get a vague position from wifi data (which isn t great, when walking through less densely populated areas). I ve seen another PinePhone running gpsd and getting data from an external GPS receiver via bluetooth, and if I really needed it I may seriously consider that solution. Also, the apps available in mobian aren t great either, even when compared to running tangogps on an OpenMoko with pre-downloaded maps (I mean! I don t think my expectations are too high!). I ve heard that PureMaps is quite good as a software, but a bit of a PITA to package for Debian, and I really hope that one day there will be a linux-first mobile device with good GPS hardware, so that people will be encouraged to fix the software side. Thankfully, I don t usually need GPS and navigation software; when I m driving into places I don t know I usually have a human navigator, and when walking into places I can do with just a static map (either printed on paper or on the PinePhone), maybe some pre-calculated route from the OSM website and looking at street names to find out where I am. Overall, for my use cases the PinePhone works just fine and is an useful addition to the things I always carry with me, and I don t feel the pressing need to get an android phone. I don t think it s ready as a daily driver for everybody, but I think that depending on one s needs it s worth asking around (I d recommend doing so on the fediverse with a #PinePhone and #mobian hashtag), as there is a non-zero chance that it may be a good fit for you.
  1. which, if I m not mistaken, is often not implied by the fact of owning it :D
  2. for very low values of feature: it doesn t have any kind of internet access, and there are only 3 games, one of which is snake.
  3. don t ask.

1 February 2023

Julian Andres Klode: Ubuntu 2022v1 secure boot key rotation and friends

This is the story of the currently progressing changes to secure boot on Ubuntu and the history of how we got to where we are.

taking a step back: how does secure boot on Ubuntu work? Booting on Ubuntu involves three components after the firmware:
  1. shim
  2. grub
  3. linux
Each of these is a PE binary signed with a key. The shim is signed by Microsoft s 3rd party key and embeds a self-signed Canonical CA certificate, and optionally a vendor dbx (a list of revoked certificates or binaries). grub and linux (and fwupd) are then signed by a certificate issued by that CA In Ubuntu s case, the CA certificate is sharded: Multiple people each have a part of the key and they need to meet to be able to combine it and sign things, such as new code signing certificates.

BootHole When BootHole happened in 2020, travel was suspended and we hence could not rotate to a new signing certificate. So when it came to updating our shim for the CVEs, we had to revoke all previously signed kernels, grubs, shims, fwupds by their hashes. This generated a very large vendor dbx which caused lots of issues as shim exported them to a UEFI variable, and not everyone had enough space for such large variables. Sigh. We decided we want to rotate our signing key next time. This was also when upstream added SBAT metadata to shim and grub. This gives a simple versioning scheme for security updates and easy revocation using a simple EFI variable that shim writes to and reads from.

Spring 2022 CVEs We still were not ready for travel in 2021, but during BootHole we developed the SBAT mechanism, so one could revoke a grub or shim by setting a single EFI variable. We actually missed rotating the shim this cycle as a new vulnerability was reported immediately after it, and we decided to hold on to it.

2022 key rotation and the fall CVEs This caused some problems when the 2nd CVE round came, as we did not have a shim with the latest SBAT level, and neither did a lot of others, so we ended up deciding upstream to not bump the shim SBAT requirements just yet. Sigh. Anyway, in October we were meeting again for the first time at a Canonical sprint, and the shardholders got together and created three new signing keys: 2022v1, 2022v2, and 2022v3. It took us until January before they were installed into the signing service and PPAs setup to sign with them. We also submitted a shim 15.7 with the old keys revoked which came back at around the same time. Now we were in a hurry. The 22.04.2 point release was scheduled for around middle of February, and we had nothing signed with the new keys yet, but our new shim which we need for the point release (so the point release media remains bootable after the next round of CVEs), required new keys. So how do we ensure that users have kernels, grubs, and fwupd signed with the new key before we install the new shim?

upgrade ordering grub and fwupd are simple cases: For grub, we depend on the new version. We decided to backport grub 2.06 to all releases (which moved focal and bionic up from 2.04), and kept the versioning of the -signed packages the same across all releases, so we were able to simply bump the Depends for grub to specify the new minimum version. For fwupd-efi, we added Breaks. (Actually, we also had a backport of the CVEs for 2.04 based grub, and we did publish that for 20.04 signed with the old keys before backporting 2.06 to it.) Kernels are a different story: There are about 60 kernels out there. My initial idea was that we could just add Breaks for all of them. So our meta package linux-image-generic which depends on linux-image-$(uname -r)-generic, we d simply add Breaks: linux-image-generic ( 5.19.0-31) and then adjust those breaks for each series. This would have been super annoying, but ultimately I figured this would be the safest option. This however caused concern, because it could be that apt decides to remove the kernel metapackage. I explored checking the kernels at runtime and aborting if we don t have a trusted kernel in preinst. This ensures that if you try to upgrade shim without having a kernel, it would fail to install. But this ultimately has a couple of issues:
  1. It aborts the entire transaction at that point, so users will be unable to run apt upgrade until they have a recent kernel.
  2. We cannot even guarantee that a kernel would be unpacked first. So even if you got a new kernel, apt/dpkg might attempt to unpack it first and then the preinst would fail because no kernel is present yet.
Ultimately we believed the danger to be too large given that no kernels had yet been released to users. If we had kernels pushed out for 1-2 months already, this would have been a viable choice. So in the end, I ended up modifying the shim packaging to install both the latest shim and the previous one, and an update-alternatives alternative to select between the two: In it s post-installation maintainer script, shim-signed checks whether all kernels with a version greater or equal to the running one are not revoked, and if so, it will setup the latest alternative with priority 100 and the previous with a priority of 50. If one or more of those kernels was signed with a revoked key, it will swap the priorities around, so that the previous version is preferred. Now this is fairly static, and we do want you to switch to the latest shim eventually, so I also added hooks to the kernel install to trigger the shim-signed postinst script when a new kernel is being installed. It will then update the alternatives based on the current set of kernels, and if it now points to the latest shim, reinstall shim and grub to the ESP. Ultimately this means that once you install your 2nd non-revoked kernel, or you install a non-revoked kernel and then reconfigure shim or the kernel, you will get the latest shim. When you install your first non-revoked kernel, your currently booted kernel is still revoked, so it s not upgraded immediately. This has a benefit in that you will most likely have two kernels you can boot without disabling secure boot.

regressions Of course, the first version I uploaded had still some remaining hardcoded shimx64 in the scripts and so failed to install on arm64 where shimaa64 is used. And if that were not enough, I also forgot to include support for gzip compressed kernels there. Sigh, I need better testing infrastructure to be able to easily run arm64 tests as well (I only tested the actual booting there, not the scripts). shim-signed migrated to the release pocket in lunar fairly quickly, but this caused images to stop working, because the new shim was installed into images, but no kernel was available yet, so we had to demote it to proposed and block migration. Despite all the work done for end users, we need to be careful to roll this out for image building.

another grub update for OOM issues. We had two grubs to release: First there was the security update for the recent set of CVEs, then there also was an OOM issue for large initrds which was blocking critical OEM work. We fixed the OOM issue by cherry-picking all 2.12 memory management patches, as well as the red hat patches to the loader we take from there. This ended up a fairly large patch set and I was hesitant to tie the security update to that, so I ended up pushing the security update everywhere first, and then pushed the OOM fixes this week. With the OOM patches, you should be able to boot initrds of between 400M and 1GB, it also depends on the memory layout of your machine and your screen resolution and background images. So OEM team had success testing 400MB irl, and I tested up to I think it was 1.2GB in qemu, I ran out of FAT space then and stopped going higher :D

other features in this round
  • Intel TDX support in grub and shim
  • Kernels are allocated as CODE now not DATA as per the upstream mm changes, might fix boot on X13s

am I using this yet? The new signing keys are used in:
  • shim-signed 1.54 on 22.10+, 1.51.3 on 22.04, 1.40.9 on 20.04, 1.37~18.04.13 on 18.04
  • grub2-signed 1.187.2~ or newer (binary packages grub-efi-amd64-signed or grub-efi-arm64-signed), 1.192 on 23.04.
  • fwupd-signed 1.51~ or newer
  • various linux updates. Check apt changelog linux-image-unsigned-$(uname -r) to see if Revoke & rotate to new signing key (LP: #2002812) is mentioned in there to see if it signed with the new key.
If you were able to install shim-signed, your grub and fwupd-efi will have the correct version as that is ensured by packaging. However your shim may still point to the old one. To check which shim will be used by grub-install, you can check the status of the shimx64.efi.signed or (on arm64) shimaa64.efi.signed alternative. The best link needs to point to the file ending in latest: 
$ update-alternatives --display shimx64.efi.signed
shimx64.efi.signed - auto mode
  link best version is /usr/lib/shim/shimx64.efi.signed.latest
  link currently points to /usr/lib/shim/shimx64.efi.signed.latest
  link shimx64.efi.signed is /usr/lib/shim/shimx64.efi.signed
/usr/lib/shim/shimx64.efi.signed.latest - priority 100
/usr/lib/shim/shimx64.efi.signed.previous - priority 50
If it does not, but you have installed a new kernel compatible with the new shim, you can switch immediately to the new shim after rebooting into the kernel by running dpkg-reconfigure shim-signed. You ll see in the output if the shim was updated, or you can check the output of update-alternatives as you did above after the reconfiguration has finished. For the out of memory issues in grub, you need grub2-signed 1.187.3~ (same binaries as above).

how do I test this (while it s in proposed)?
  1. upgrade your kernel to proposed and reboot into that
  2. upgrade your grub-efi-amd64-signed, shim-signed, fwupd-signed to proposed.
If you already upgraded your shim before your kernel, don t worry:
  1. upgrade your kernel and reboot
  2. run dpkg-reconfigure shim-signed
And you ll be all good to go.

deep dive: uploading signed boot assets to Ubuntu For each signed boot asset, we build one version in the latest stable release and the development release. We then binary copy the built binaries from the latest stable release to older stable releases. This process ensures two things: We know the next stable release is able to build the assets and we also minimize the number of signed assets. OK, I lied. For shim, we actually do not build in the development release but copy the binaries upward from the latest stable, as each shim needs to go through external signing. The entire workflow looks something like this:
  1. Upload the unsigned package to one of the following build PPAs:
  2. Upload the signed package to the same PPA
  3. For stable release uploads:
    • Copy the unsigned package back across all stable releases in the PPA
    • Upload the signed package for stable releases to the same PPA with ~<release>.1 appended to the version
  4. Submit a request to canonical-signing-jobs to sign the uploads. The signing job helper copies the binary -unsigned packages to the primary-2022v1 PPA where they are signed, creating a signing tarball, then it copies the source package for the -signed package to the same PPA which then downloads the signing tarball during build and places the signed assets into the -signed deb. Resulting binaries will be placed into the proposed PPA: https://launchpad.net/~ubuntu-uefi-team/+archive/ubuntu/proposed
  5. Review the binaries themselves
  6. Unembargo and binary copy the binaries from the proposed PPA to the proposed-public PPA: https://launchpad.net/~ubuntu-uefi-team/+archive/ubuntu/proposed-public. This step is not strictly necessary, but it enables tools like sru-review to work, as they cannot access the packages from the normal private proposed PPA.
  7. Binary copy from proposed-public to the proposed queue(s) in the primary archive
Lots of steps!

WIP As of writing, only the grub updates have been released, other updates are still being verified in proposed. An update for fwupd in bionic will be issued at a later point, removing the EFI bits from the fwupd 1.2 packaging and using the separate fwupd-efi project instead like later release series.

4 January 2023

Enrico Zini: Staticsite redesign

These are some notes about my redesign work in staticsite 2.x. Maping constraints and invariants I started keeping notes of constraints and invariants, and this helped a lot in keeping bounds on the cognitive efforts of design. I particularly liked how mapping the set of constraints added during site generation has helped breaking down processing into a series of well defined steps. Code that handles each step now has a specific task, and can rely on clear assumptions. Declarative page metadata I designed page metadata as declarative fields added to the Page class. I used typed descriptors for the fields, so that metadata fields can now have logic and validation, and are self-documenting! This is the core of the Field implementation. Lean core I tried to implement as much as possible in feature plugins, leaving to the staticsite core only what is essential to create the structure for plugins to build on. The core provides a tree structure, an abstract Page object that can render to a file and resolve references to other pages, a Site that holds settings and controls the various loading steps, and little else. The only type of content supported by the core is static asset files: Markdown, RestructuredText, images, taxonomies, feeds, directory indices, and so on, are all provided via feature plugins. Feature plugins Feature plugins work by providing functions to be called at the various loading steps, and mixins to be added to site pages. Mixins provided by feature plugins can add new declarative metadata fields, and extend Page methods: this ends up being very clean and powerful, and plays decently well with mypy's static type checking, too! See for example the code of the alias feature, that allows a page to declare aliases that redirect to it, useful for example when moving content around. It has a mixin (AliasPageMixin) that adds an aliases field that holds a list of page paths. During the "generate" step, when autogenerated pages can be created, the aliases feature iterates through all pages that defined an aliases metadata, and generates the corresponding redirection pages. Self-documenting code Staticsite can list loaded features, features can list the page subclasses that they use, and pages can list metadata fields. As a result, each feature, each type of page, and each field of each page can generate documentation about itself: the staticsite reference is autogenerated in that way, mostly from Feature, Page, and Field docstrings. Understand the language, stay close to the language Python has matured massively in the last years, and I like to stay on top of the language and standard library release notes for each release. I like how what used to be dirty hacks have now found a clean way into the language:

2 January 2023

Gunnar Wolf: Refueling the blog

So, it s this weird time of year where we make a balance and share with the world some ideas about the future. And yes, it s time to take care of this blog, as its activity has dropped once again. So maybe it d be nice to start this post by checking how much have I blogged over the years: (yes, this is an old blog) So yes, there is a clear downwards trend towards the last few years. And it does make sense, all in all: Not only have I managed to keep myself busier than before, but Blogging is a social endeavor. And as people have moved over to the different flavors of social networks, there is somewhat less fueling us to share our thoughts and experiences in this fashion. So this connects me to my first point: Staring at Noodles Emptiness, I got to a campaign to Bring Back Blogging. I stand by all of what they suggest: Blogs are a great invention, they allow the sharing of a great insight into a person s mind, ideas and worldview (and even more so if, like mine, it shows already a window of almost two decades of life! This year my blog will be old enough to vote!), they are completely decentralized, and can be easily grouped according to each readers preferences via the RSS format. Anyway I do want to write a post summing up 2022, as well as sharing some hopes and projects I have for 2023. But I don t want to make it too long to read. So That shall be the blog post for today! (post caption image by Walt Stoneburner on Flickr; CC BY 2.0)

1 January 2023

Jonathan McDowell: Free Software Activities for 2022

There is a move to Bring Back Blogging and having recently sorted out my own FreshRSS install I am completely in favour of such a thing. RSS feeds with complete posts, for preference, not just a teaser intro sentence/paragraph. It s also a reminder to me that I should blog more, and what better way to start 2023 than with my traditional recap of my Free Software activities in 2022. For previous years see 2019, 2020 + 2021

Conferences I attended DebConf22 in Prizen, Kosova this year, and finally hit the end of my luck in avoiding COVID. 0/10, would not recommend. Thankfully I didn t come down with symptoms until I got home (I felt fine and tested negative on arrival home, then started to feel terrible the next day and tested again), so I was able to enjoy the conference itself. I also made it to Linux Security Summit Europe 2022, which aligned with work related bits and was interesting. I suspect I would have been better going to LPC 2022 for the hallway track, though I did manage to get some overlap with folk being in town given that both were the same week.

Debian Most of my contributions to Free software continue to happen within Debian. We continue to operate a roughly 3 month rotation for Debian Keyring in terms of handling the regular updates, and I dealt with 2022.03.24, 2022.06.26, 2022.08.11, 2022.09.24, 2022.09.25 + 2022.12.24. There were a few out of cycle updates this year and I handled a couple of them. My other contributions are largely within the Debian Electronics Packaging Team. gcc-xtensa-lx106 saw a few updates, to GCC 11 + enabling D (10 + 11), then to GCC 12 (12). binutils-xtensa-lx106 got some minor packaging cleanups, which also served to force a rebuild with the current binutils source (5). libsigrokdecode got an upload to enable building with Python 3.10 (0.5.3-3). Related, I updated sdcc to a new upstream version (4.2.0+dfsg-1) - it s used for the sigrok-firmware-fx2lafw package and I do have a tendency to play with microcontrollers, so it s good to have a recent version available in the archive. I continue to pay attention to OpenOCD, with a minor set of updates to pull in some fixes from master (0.11.0-2). I was pleased to see the release process for 0.12.0 kick off and have been uploading RCs as they come out (0.12.0~rc1-1, 0.12.0~rc2-1 + 0.12.0~rc3-1). Upstream have been interested in the upcoming bookworm release cycle and I m hopeful we ll get 0.12.0 proper in before freeze. libjaylink also saw an upstream release (0.3.1-1). Package upload sponsorship isn t normally something I get involved with, because I find I have to spend a lot of time checking over things before I m comfortable doing the upload. However I did sponsor an initial upload for sugarjar and an update for mgba (0.10.0+dsfg-1, currently stuck in NEW). Credit to Michel for dealing swiftly with my review comments, and Ryan for producing a nicely reviewable set of changes. As part of the Data Protection Team I responded to various inbound queries to that team. There was also some discussion on debian-vote as part of the DPL election that I engaged with, as well as discussions at DebConf about how we can do things better. For Debian New Members I m mostly inactive as an application manager - we generally seem to have enough available recently. If that changes I ll look at stepping in to help, but I don t see that happening (it got close this year but several people had stood up before I got around to offering). I continue to be involved in Front Desk, having various conversations throughout the year with the rest of the team and occasionally approving some of the checks for new applicants. Towards the end of the year I got involved with the Debian Games Team, largely because I m keen to try and get my Kodi working with libretro based emulators - I d really like to be able to play old style games from the same interface as I can engage with locally stored movies, music and TV. It turns out there are a lot of moving pieces to make that happen, some missing from Debian and others in need of some TLC. I updated retroarch to current upstream (1.13.0+dfsg-1 + 1.13.0+dfsg-2) but while I was doing so upstream did another release. I plan on uploading 1.14.0 once 1.13.0 has migrated to testing. It turned out I also needed to update libretro-core-info (1.13.0-1) and retroarch-assets (1.7.6+git20221024+dfsg-1). In terms of actual emulators I pulled in new versions for genesisplusgx (1.7.4+git20221128-1) and libretro-bsnes-mercury (094+git20220807-1). On the Kodi side I haven t uploaded anything yet. I ve filed an ITP for rcheevos, which is a dependency for game.libretro and I have a fledgling package for game.libretro that I finally got working today. I m not sure if I can get it cleaned up enough in time to make the bookworm release, but I m hoping that at least the libretro piece is in a bit better shape now (though I m aware there are more emulator cores that could do with being updated).

Linux This year was a quiet year for personal Linux contributions. I submitted a minor fix for the qca8081 PHY with speeds lower than 2.5Gb/s that caused me issues on my RB5009.

Personal projects 2022 finally saw a minor releases of onak, 0.6.2, which resulted in a corresponding Debian upload (0.6.2-1). It has a couple of bug fixes but nothing major.. As I said last year it s not dead, just resting, but Sequoia PGP is probably where you should be looking for a modern OpenPGP implementation. I added some basic Debian packaging to mqtt-arp - I didn t bother uploading it as it s a fairly niche package, but I m using it locally.

26 December 2022

Vincent Bernat: Managing infrastructure with Terraform, CDKTF, and NixOS

A few years ago, I downsized my personal infrastructure. Until 2018, there were a dozen containers running on a single Hetzner server.1 I migrated my emails to Fastmail and my DNS zones to Gandi. It left me with only my blog to self-host. As of today, my low-scale infrastructure is composed of 4 virtual machines running NixOS on Hetzner Cloud and Vultr, a handful of DNS zones on Gandi and Route 53, and a couple of Cloudfront distributions. It is managed by CDK for Terraform (CDKTF), while NixOS deployments are handled by NixOps. In this article, I provide a brief introduction to Terraform, CDKTF, and the Nix ecosystem. I also explain how to use Nix to access these tools within your shell, so you can quickly start using them.

CDKTF: infrastructure as code Terraform is an infrastructure-as-code tool. You can define your infrastructure by declaring resources with the HCL language. This language has some additional features like loops to declare several resources from a list, built-in functions you can call in expressions, and string templates. Terraform relies on a large set of providers to manage resources.

Managing servers Here is a short example using the Hetzner Cloud provider to spawn a virtual machine: 
variable "hcloud_token"  
  sensitive = true
 
provider "hcloud"  
  token = var.hcloud_token
 
resource "hcloud_server" "web03"  
  name = "web03"
  server_type = "cpx11"
  image = "debian-11"
  datacenter = "nbg1-dc3"
 
resource "hcloud_rdns" "rdns4-web03"  
  server_id = hcloud_server.web03.id
  ip_address = hcloud_server.web03.ipv4_address
  dns_ptr = "web03.luffy.cx"
 
resource "hcloud_rdns" "rdns6-web03"  
  server_id = hcloud_server.web03.id
  ip_address = hcloud_server.web03.ipv6_address
  dns_ptr = "web03.luffy.cx"
HCL expressiveness is quite limited and I find a general-purpose language more convenient to describe all the resources. This is where CDK for Terraform comes in: you can manage your infrastructure using your preferred programming language, including TypeScript, Go, and Python. Here is the previous example using CDKTF and TypeScript: 
import   App, TerraformStack, Fn   from "cdktf";
import   HcloudProvider   from "./.gen/providers/hcloud/provider";
import * as hcloud from "./.gen/providers/hcloud";
class MyStack extends TerraformStack  
  constructor(scope: Construct, name: string)  
    super(scope, name);
    const hcloudToken = new TerraformVariable(this, "hcloudToken",  
      type: "string",
      sensitive: true,
     );
    const hcloudProvider = new HcloudProvider(this, "hcloud",  
      token: hcloudToken.value,
     );
    const web03 = new hcloud.server.Server(this, "web03",  
      name: "web03",
      serverType: "cpx11",
      image: "debian-11",
      datacenter: "nbg1-dc3",
      provider: hcloudProvider,
     );
    new hcloud.rdns.Rdns(this, "rdns4-web03",  
      serverId: Fn.tonumber(web03.id),
      ipAddress: web03.ipv4Address,
      dnsPtr: "web03.luffy.cx",
      provider: hcloudProvider,
     );
    new hcloud.rdns.Rdns(this, "rdns6-web03",  
      serverId: Fn.tonumber(web03.id),
      ipAddress: web03.ipv6Address,
      dnsPtr: "web03.luffy.cx",
      provider: hcloudProvider,
     );
   
 
const app = new App();
new MyStack(app, "cdktf-take1");
app.synth();
Running cdktf synth generates a configuration file for Terraform, terraform plan previews the changes, and terraform apply applies them. Now that you have a general-purpose language, you can use functions.

Managing DNS records While using CDKTF for 4 web servers may seem a tad overkill, this is quite different when it comes to managing a few DNS zones. With DNSControl, which is using JavaScript as a domain-specific language, I was able to define the bernat.ch zone with this snippet of code: 
D("bernat.ch", REG_NONE, DnsProvider(DNS_BIND, 0), DnsProvider(DNS_GANDI),
  DefaultTTL('2h'),
  FastMailMX('bernat.ch',  subdomains: ['vincent'] ),
  WebServers('@'),
  WebServers('vincent');
This generated 38 records. With CDKTF, I use: 
new Route53Zone(this, "bernat.ch", providers.aws)
  .sign(dnsCMK)
  .registrar(providers.gandiVB)
  .www("@", servers)
  .www("vincent", servers)
  .www("media", servers)
  .fastmailMX(["vincent"]);
All the magic is in the code that I did not show you. You can check the dns.ts file in the cdktf-take1 repository to see how it works. Here is a quick explanation:
  • Route53Zone() creates a new zone hosted by Route 53,
  • sign() signs the zone with the provided master key,
  • registrar() registers the zone to the registrar of the domain and sets up DNSSEC,
  • www() creates A and AAAA records for the provided name pointing to the web servers,
  • fastmailMX() creates the MX records and other support records to direct emails to Fastmail.
Here is the content of the fastmailMX() function. It generates a few records and returns the current zone for chaining: 
fastmailMX(subdomains?: string[])  
  (subdomains ?? [])
    .concat(["@", "*"])
    .forEach((subdomain) =>
      this.MX(subdomain, [
        "10 in1-smtp.messagingengine.com.",
        "20 in2-smtp.messagingengine.com.",
      ])
    );
  this.TXT("@", "v=spf1 include:spf.messagingengine.com ~all");
  ["mesmtp", "fm1", "fm2", "fm3"].forEach((dk) =>
    this.CNAME( $ dk ._domainkey ,  $ dk .$ this.name .dkim.fmhosted.com. )
  );
  this.TXT("_dmarc", "v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none");
  return this;
I encourage you to browse the repository if you need more information.

About Pulumi My first tentative around Terraform was to use Pulumi. You can find this attempt on GitHub. This is quite similar to what I currently do with CDKTF. The main difference is that I am using Python instead of TypeScript because I was not familiar with TypeScript at the time.2 Pulumi predates CDKTF and it uses a slightly different approach. CDKTF generates a Terraform configuration (in JSON format instead of HCL), delegating planning, state management, and deployment to Terraform. It is therefore bound to the limitations of what can be expressed by Terraform, notably when you need to transform data obtained from one resource to another.3 Pulumi needs specific providers for each resource. Many Pulumi providers are thin wrappers encapsulating Terraform providers. While Pulumi provides a good user experience, I switched to CDKTF because writing providers for Pulumi is a chore. CDKTF does not require such a step. Outside the big players (AWS, Azure and Google Cloud), the existence, quality, and freshness of the Pulumi providers are inconsistent. Most providers rely on a Terraform provider and they may lag a few versions behind, miss a few resources, or have a few bugs of their own. When a provider does not exist, you can write one with the help of the pulumi-terraform-bridge library. The Pulumi project provides a boilerplate for this purpose. I had a bad experience with it when writing providers for Gandi and Vultr: the Makefile automatically installs Pulumi using a curl sh pattern and does not work with /bin/sh. There is a lack of interest for community-based contributions4 or even for providers for smaller players.

NixOS & NixOps Nix is a functional, purely-functional programming language. Nix is also the name of the package manager that is built on top of the Nix language. It allows users to declaratively install packages. nixpkgs is a repository of packages. You can install Nix on top of a regular Linux distribution. If you want more details, a good resource is the official website, and notably the learn section. There is a steep learning curve, but the reward is tremendous.

NixOS: declarative Linux distribution NixOS is a Linux distribution built on top of the Nix package manager. Here is a configuration snippet to add some packages: 
environment.systemPackages = with pkgs;
  [
    bat
    htop
    liboping
    mg
    mtr
    ncdu
    tmux
  ];
It is possible to alter an existing derivation5 to use a different version, enable a specific feature, or apply a patch. Here is how I enable and configure Nginx to disable the stream module, add the Brotli compression module, and add the IP address anonymizer module. Moreover, instead of using OpenSSL 3, I keep using OpenSSL 1.1.6 
services.nginx =  
  enable = true;
  package = (pkgs.nginxStable.override  
    withStream = false;
    modules = with pkgs.nginxModules; [
      brotli
      ipscrub
    ];
    openssl = pkgs.openssl_1_1;
   );
If you need to add some patches, it is also possible. Here are the patches I added in 2019 to circumvent the DoS vulnerabilities in Nginx until they were fixed in NixOS:7 
services.nginx.package = pkgs.nginxStable.overrideAttrs (old:  
  patches = oldAttrs.patches ++ [
    # HTTP/2: reject zero length headers with PROTOCOL_ERROR.
    (pkgs.fetchpatch  
      url = https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/dbdd[ ].patch;
      sha256 = "a48190[ ]";
     )
    # HTTP/2: limited number of DATA frames.
    (pkgs.fetchpatch  
      url = https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/94c5[ ].patch;
      sha256 = "af591a[ ]";
     )
    #  HTTP/2: limited number of PRIORITY frames.
    (pkgs.fetchpatch  
      url = https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/39bb[ ].patch;
      sha256 = "1ad8fe[ ]";
     )
  ];
 );
If you are interested, have a look at my relatively small configuration: common.nix contains the configuration to be applied to any host (SSH, users, common software packages), web.nix contains the configuration for the web servers, isso.nix runs Isso into a systemd container.

NixOps: NixOS deployment tool On a single node, NixOS configuration is in the /etc/nixos/configuration.nix file. After modifying it, you have to run nixos-rebuild switch. Nix fetches all possible dependencies from the binary cache and builds the remaining packages. It creates a new entry in the boot loader menu and activates the new configuration. To manage several nodes, there exists several options, including NixOps, deploy-rs, Colmena, and morph. I do not know all of them, but from my point of view, the differences are not that important. It is also possible to build such a tool yourself as Nix provides the most important building blocks: nix build and nix copy. NixOps is one of the first tools available but I encourage you to explore the alternatives. NixOps configuration is written in Nix. Here is a simplified configuration to deploy znc01.luffy.cx, web01.luffy.cx, and web02.luffy.cx, with the help of the server and web functions: 
let
  server = hardware: name: imports:  
    deployment.targetHost = "$ name .luffy.cx";
    networking.hostName = name;
    networking.domain = "luffy.cx";
    imports = [ (./hardware/. + "/$ hardware .nix") ] ++ imports;
   ;
  web = hardware: idx: imports:
    server hardware "web$ lib.fixedWidthNumber 2 idx " ([ ./web.nix ] ++ imports);
in  
  network.description = "Luffy infrastructure";
  network.enableRollback = true;
  defaults = import ./common.nix;
  znc01 = server "exoscale" [ ./znc.nix ];
  web01 = web "hetzner" 1 [ ./isso.nix ];
  web02 = web "hetzner" 2 [];

Tying everything together with Nix The Nix ecosystem is a unified solution to the various problems around software and configuration management. A very interesting feature is the declarative and reproducible developer environments. This is similar to Python virtual environments, except it is not language-specific.

Brief introduction to Nix flakes I am using flakes, a new Nix feature improving reproducibility by pinning all dependencies and making the build hermetic. While the feature is marked as experimental,8 it is widely used and you may see flake.nix and flake.lock at the root of some repositories. As a short example, here is the flake.nix content shipped with Snimpy, an interactive SNMP tool for Python relying on libsmi, a C library: 
 
  inputs =  
    nixpkgs.url = "nixpkgs";
    flake-utils.url = "github:numtide/flake-utils";
   ;
  outputs =   self, ...  @inputs:
    inputs.flake-utils.lib.eachDefaultSystem (system:
      let
        pkgs = inputs.nixpkgs.legacyPackages."$ system ";
      in
       
        # nix build
        packages.default = pkgs.python3Packages.buildPythonPackage  
          name = "snimpy";
          src = self;
          preConfigure = ''echo "1.0.0-0-000000000000" > version.txt'';
          checkPhase = "pytest";
          checkInputs = with pkgs.python3Packages; [ pytest mock coverage ];
          propagatedBuildInputs = with pkgs.python3Packages; [ cffi pysnmp ipython ];
          buildInputs = [ pkgs.libsmi ];
         ;
        # nix run + nix shell
        apps.default =   
          type = "app";
          program = "$ self.packages."$ system ".default /bin/snimpy";
         ;
        # nix develop
        devShells.default = pkgs.mkShell  
          name = "snimpy-dev";
          buildInputs = [
            self.packages."$ system ".default.inputDerivation
            pkgs.python3Packages.ipython
          ];
         ;
       );
If you have Nix installed on your system:
  • nix run github:vincentbernat/snimpy runs Snimpy,
  • nix shell github:vincentbernat/snimpy provides a shell with Snimpy ready-to-use,
  • nix build github:vincentbernat/snimpy builds the Python package, tests included, and
  • nix develop . provides a shell to hack around Snimpy when run from a fresh checkout.9
For more information about Nix flakes, have a look at the tutorial from Tweag.

Nix and CDKTF At the root of the repository I use for CDKTF, there is a flake.nix file to set up a shell with Terraform and CDKTF installed and with the appropriate environment variables to automate my infrastructure. Terraform is already packaged in nixpkgs. However, I need to apply a patch on top of the Gandi provider. Not a problem with Nix! 
terraform = pkgs.terraform.withPlugins (p: [
  p.aws
  p.hcloud
  p.vultr
  (p.gandi.overrideAttrs
    (old:  
      src = pkgs.fetchFromGitHub  
        owner = "vincentbernat";
        repo = "terraform-provider-gandi";
        rev = "feature/livedns-key";
        hash = "sha256-V16BIjo5/rloQ1xTQrdd0snoq1OPuDh3fQNW7kiv/kQ=";
       ;
     ))
]);
CDKTF is written in TypeScript. I have a package.json file with all the dependencies needed, including the ones to use TypeScript as the language to define infrastructure: 
 
  "name": "cdktf-take1",
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "main": "main.js",
  "types": "main.ts",
  "private": true,
  "dependencies":  
    "@types/node": "^14.18.30",
    "cdktf": "^0.13.3",
    "cdktf-cli": "^0.13.3",
    "constructs": "^10.1.151",
    "eslint": "^8.27.0",
    "prettier": "^2.7.1",
    "ts-node": "^10.9.1",
    "typescript": "^3.9.10",
    "typescript-language-server": "^2.1.0"
I use Yarn to get a yarn.lock file that can be used directly to declare a derivation containing all the dependencies: 
nodeEnv = pkgs.mkYarnModules  
  pname = "cdktf-take1-js-modules";
  version = "1.0.0";
  packageJSON = ./package.json;
  yarnLock = ./yarn.lock;
 ;
The next step is to generate the CDKTF providers from the Terraform providers and turn them into a derivation: 
cdktfProviders = pkgs.stdenvNoCC.mkDerivation  
  name = "cdktf-providers";
  nativeBuildInputs = [
    pkgs.nodejs
    terraform
  ];
  src = nix-filter  
    root = ./.;
    include = [ ./cdktf.json ./tsconfig.json ];
   ;
  buildPhase = ''
    export HOME=$(mktemp -d)
    export CHECKPOINT_DISABLE=1
    export DISABLE_VERSION_CHECK=1
    export PATH=$ nodeEnv /node_modules/.bin:$PATH
    ln -nsf $ nodeEnv /node_modules node_modules
    # Build all providers we have in terraform
    for provider in $(cd $ terraform /libexec/terraform-providers; echo */*/*/*); do
      version=''$ provider##*/ 
      provider=''$ provider%/* 
      echo "Build $provider@$version"
      cdktf provider add --force-local $provider@$version   cat
    done
    echo "Compile TS   JS"
    tsc
  '';
  installPhase = ''
    mv .gen $out
    ln -nsf $ nodeEnv /node_modules $out/node_modules
  '';
 ;
Finally, we can define the development environment: 
devShells.default = pkgs.mkShell  
  name = "cdktf-take1";
  buildInputs = [
    pkgs.nodejs
    pkgs.yarn
    terraform
  ];
  shellHook = ''
    # No telemetry
    export CHECKPOINT_DISABLE=1
    # No autoinstall of plugins
    export CDKTF_DISABLE_PLUGIN_CACHE_ENV=1
    # Do not check version
    export DISABLE_VERSION_CHECK=1
    # Access to node modules
    export PATH=$PWD/node_modules/.bin:$PATH
    ln -nsf $ nodeEnv /node_modules node_modules
    ln -nsf $ cdktfProviders  .gen
    # Credentials
    for p in \
      njf.nznmba.pbz/Nqzvavfgengbe \
      urgmare.pbz/ivaprag@oreang.pu \
      ihyge.pbz/ihyge@ivaprag.oreang.pu; do
        eval $(pass show $(echo $p   tr 'A-Za-z' 'N-ZA-Mn-za-m')   grep '^export')
    done
    eval $(pass show personal/cdktf/secrets   grep '^export')
    export TF_VAR_hcloudToken="$HCLOUD_TOKEN"
    export TF_VAR_vultrApiKey="$VULTR_API_KEY"
    unset VULTR_API_KEY HCLOUD_TOKEN
  '';
 ;
The derivations listed in buildInputs are available in the provided shell. The content of shellHook is sourced when starting the shell. It sets up some symbolic links to make the JavaScript environment built at an earlier step available, as well as the generated CDKTF providers. It also exports all the credentials.10 I am also using direnv with an .envrc to automatically load the development environment. This also enables the environment to be available from inside Emacs, notably when using lsp-mode to get TypeScript completions. Without direnv, nix develop . can activate the environment. I use the following commands to deploy the infrastructure:11 
$ cdktf synth
$ cd cdktf.out/stacks/cdktf-take1
$ terraform plan --out plan
$ terraform apply plan
$ terraform output -json > ~-automation/nixops-take1/cdktf.json
The last command generates a JSON file containing various data to complete the deployment with NixOps.

NixOps The JSON file exported by Terraform contains the list of servers with various attributes: 
 
  "hardware": "hetzner",
  "ipv4Address": "5.161.44.145",
  "ipv6Address": "2a01:4ff:f0:b91::1",
  "name": "web05.luffy.cx",
  "tags": [
    "web",
    "continent:NA",
    "continent:SA"
  ]
In network.nix, this list is imported and transformed into an attribute set describing the servers. A simplified version looks like this: 
let
  lib = inputs.nixpkgs.lib;
  shortName = name: builtins.elemAt (lib.splitString "." name) 0;
  domainName = name: lib.concatStringsSep "." (builtins.tail (lib.splitString "." name));
  server = hardware: name: imports:  
    networking =  
      hostName = shortName name;
      domain = domainName name;
     ;
    deployment.targetHost = name;
    imports = [ (./hardware/. + "/$ hardware .nix") ] ++ imports;
   ;
  cdktf-servers-json = (lib.importJSON ./cdktf.json).servers.value;
  cdktf-servers = map
    (s:
      let
        tags-maybe-import = map (t: ./. + "/$ t .nix") s.tags;
        tags-import = builtins.filter (t: builtins.pathExists t) tags-maybe-import;
      in
       
        name = shortName s.name;
        value = server s.hardware s.name tags-import;
       )
    cdktf-servers-json;
in
 
  // [ ]
  // builtins.listToAttrs cdktf-servers
For web05, this expands to: 
web05 =  
  networking =  
    hostName = "web05";
    domainName = "luffy.cx";
   ;
  deployment.targetHost = "web05.luffy.cx";
  imports = [ ./hardware/hetzner.nix ./web.nix ];
 ;
As for CDKTF, at the root of the repository I use for NixOps, there is a flake.nix file to set up a shell with NixOps configured. Because NixOps do not support rollouts, I usually use the following commands to deploy on a single server:12 
$ nix flake update
$ nixops deploy --include=web04
$ ./tests web04.luffy.cx
If the tests are OK, I deploy the remaining nodes gradually with the following command: 
$ (set -e; for h in web 03..06 ; do nixops deploy --include=$h; done)
nixops deploy rolls out all servers in parallel and therefore could cause a short outage where all Nginx are down at the same time.
This post has been a work-in-progress for the past three years, with the content being updated and refined as I experimented with different solutions. There is still much to explore13 but I feel there is enough content to publish now.
  1. It was an AMD Athlon 64 X2 5600+ with 2 GB of RAM and 2 400 GB disks with software RAID. I was paying something around 59 per month for it. While it was a good deal in 2008, by 2018 it was no longer cost-effective. It was running on Debian Wheezy with Linux-VServer for isolation, both of which were outdated in 2018.
  2. I also did not use Python because Poetry support in Nix was a bit broken around the time I started hacking around CDKTF.
  3. Pulumi can apply arbitrary functions with the apply() method on an output. It makes it easy to transform data that are not known during the planning stage. Terraform has functions to serve a similar purpose, but they are more limited.
  4. The two mentioned pull requests are not merged yet. The second one is superseded by PR #61, submitted two months later, which enforces the use of /bin/bash. I also submitted PR #56, which was merged 4 months later and quickly reverted without an explanation.
  5. You may consider packages and derivations to be synonyms in the Nix ecosystem.
  6. OpenSSL 3 has outstanding performance regressions.
  7. NixOS can be a bit slow to integrate patches since they need to rebuild parts of the binary cache before releasing the fixes. In this specific case, they were fast: the vulnerability and patches were released on August 13th 2019 and available in NixOS on August 15th. As a comparison, Debian only released the fixed version on August 22nd, which is unusually late.
  8. Because flakes are experimental, many documentations do not use them and it is an additional aspect to learn.
  9. It is possible to replace . with github:vincentbernat/snimpy, like in the other commands, but having Snimpy dependencies without Snimpy source code is less interesting.
  10. I am using pass as a password manager. The password names are only obfuscated to avoid spam.
  11. The cdktf command can wrap the terraform commands, but I prefer to use them directly as they are more flexible.
  12. If the change is risky, I disable the server with CDKTF. This removes it from the web service DNS records.
  13. I would like to replace NixOps with an alternative handling progressive rollouts and checks. I am also considering switching to Nomad or Kubernetes to deploy workloads.

24 December 2022

Simon Josefsson: OpenPGP key on FST-01SZ

I use GnuPG to compute cryptographic signatures for my emails, git commits/tags, and software release artifacts (tarballs). Part of GnuPG is gpg-agent which talks to OpenSSH, which I login to remote servers and to clone git repositories. I dislike storing cryptographic keys on general-purpose machines, and have used hardware-backed OpenPGP keys since around 2006 when I got a FSFE Fellowship Card. GnuPG via gpg-agent handles this well, and the private key never leaves the hardware. The ZeitControl cards were (to my knowledge) proprietary hardware running some non-free operating system and OpenPGP implementation. By late 2012 the YubiKey NEO supported OpenPGP, and while the hardware and operating system on it was not free, at least it ran a free software OpenPGP implementation and eventually I setup my primary RSA key on it. This worked well for a couple of years, and when I in 2019 wished to migrate to a new key, the FST-01G device with open hardware running free software that supported Ed25519 had become available. I created a key and have been using the FST-01G on my main laptop since then. This little device has been working, the signature counter on it is around 14501 which means around 10 signatures/day since then! Currently I am in the process of migrating towards a new laptop, and moving the FST-01G device between them is cumbersome, especially if I want to use both laptops in parallel. That s why I need to setup a new hardware device to hold my OpenPGP key, which can go with my new laptop. This is a good time to re-visit alternatives. I quickly decided that I did not want to create a new key, only to import my current one to keep everything working. My requirements on the device to chose hasn t changed since 2019, see my summary at the end of the earlier blog post. Unfortunately the FST-01G is out of stock and the newer FST-01SZ has also out of stock. While Tillitis looks promising (and I have one to play with), it does not support OpenPGP (yet). What to do? Fortunately, I found some FST-01SZ device in my drawer, and decided to use it pending a more satisfactory answer. Hopefully once I get around to generate a new OpenPGP key in a year or so, I will do a better survey of options that are available on the market then. What are your (freedom-respecting) OpenPGP hardware recommendations?
FST-01SZ circuit board
Similar to setting up the FST-01G, the FST-01SZ needs to be setup before use. I m doing the following from Trisquel 11 but any GNU/Linux system would work. When the device is inserted at first time, some kernel messages are shown (see /var/log/syslog or use the dmesg command): 

usb 3-3: new full-speed USB device number 39 using xhci_hcd
usb 3-3: New USB device found, idVendor=234b, idProduct=0004, bcdDevice= 2.00
usb 3-3: New USB device strings: Mfr=1, Product=2, SerialNumber=3
usb 3-3: Product: Fraucheky
usb 3-3: Manufacturer: Free Software Initiative of Japan
usb 3-3: SerialNumber: FSIJ-0.0
usb-storage 3-3:1.0: USB Mass Storage device detected
scsi host1: usb-storage 3-3:1.0
scsi 1:0:0:0: Direct-Access     FSIJ     Fraucheky        1.0  PQ: 0 ANSI: 0
sd 1:0:0:0: Attached scsi generic sg2 type 0
sd 1:0:0:0: [sdc] 128 512-byte logical blocks: (65.5 kB/64.0 KiB)
sd 1:0:0:0: [sdc] Write Protect is off
sd 1:0:0:0: [sdc] Mode Sense: 03 00 00 00
sd 1:0:0:0: [sdc] No Caching mode page found
sd 1:0:0:0: [sdc] Assuming drive cache: write through
 sdc:
sd 1:0:0:0: [sdc] Attached SCSI removable disk
Interestingly, the NeuG software installed on the device I got appears to be version 1.0.9: 

jas@kaka:~$ head /media/jas/Fraucheky/README
NeuG - a true random number generator implementation
						  Version 1.0.9
						     2018-11-20
					           Niibe Yutaka
			      Free Software Initiative of Japan
What's NeuG?
============
jas@kaka:~$
I could not find version 1.0.9 published anywhere, but the device came with a SD-card that contain a copy of the source, so I uploaded it until a more canonical place is located. Putting the device in the serial mode can be done using a sudo eject /dev/sdc command which results in the following syslog output. 

usb 3-3: reset full-speed USB device number 39 using xhci_hcd
usb 3-3: device firmware changed
usb 3-3: USB disconnect, device number 39
sdc: detected capacity change from 128 to 0
usb 3-3: new full-speed USB device number 40 using xhci_hcd
usb 3-3: New USB device found, idVendor=234b, idProduct=0001, bcdDevice= 2.00
usb 3-3: New USB device strings: Mfr=1, Product=2, SerialNumber=3
usb 3-3: Product: NeuG True RNG
usb 3-3: Manufacturer: Free Software Initiative of Japan
usb 3-3: SerialNumber: FSIJ-1.0.9-42315277
cdc_acm 3-3:1.0: ttyACM0: USB ACM device
Now download Gnuk, verify its integrity and build it. You may need some additional packages installed, try apt-get install gcc-arm-none-eabi openocd python3-usb. As you can see, I m using the stable 1.2 branch of Gnuk, currently on version 1.2.20. The ./configure parameters deserve some explanation. The kdf_do=required sets up the device to require KDF usage. The --enable-factory-reset allows me to use the command factory-reset (with admin PIN) inside gpg --card-edit to completely wipe the card. Some may consider that too dangerous, but my view is that if someone has your admin PIN it is game over anyway. The --vidpid=234b:0000 is specifies the USB VID/PID to use, and --target=FST_01SZ is critical to set the platform (you ll may brick the device if you pick the wrong --target setting). 

jas@kaka:~/src$ rm -rf gnuk neug
jas@kaka:~/src$ git clone https://gitlab.com/jas/neug.git
Cloning into 'neug'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 2034, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (2034/2034), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (603/603), done.
remote: Total 2034 (delta 1405), reused 2013 (delta 1405), pack-reused 0
Receiving objects: 100% (2034/2034), 910.34 KiB   3.50 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1405/1405), done.
jas@kaka:~/src$ git clone https://salsa.debian.org/gnuk-team/gnuk/gnuk.git
Cloning into 'gnuk'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 13765, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (959/959), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (337/337), done.
remote: Total 13765 (delta 629), reused 907 (delta 599), pack-reused 12806
Receiving objects: 100% (13765/13765), 12.59 MiB   3.05 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (10077/10077), done.
jas@kaka:~/src$ cd neug
jas@kaka:~/src/neug$ git describe 
release/1.0.9
jas@kaka:~/src/neug$ git tag -v  git describe 
object 5d51022a97a5b7358d0ea62bbbc00628c6cec06a
type commit
tag release/1.0.9
tagger NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org> 1542701768 +0900
Version 1.0.9.
gpg: Signature made Tue Nov 20 09:16:08 2018 CET
gpg:                using EDDSA key 249CB3771750745D5CDD323CE267B052364F028D
gpg:                issuer "gniibe@fsij.org"
gpg: Good signature from "NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>" [unknown]
gpg:                 aka "NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@debian.org>" [unknown]
gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
gpg:          There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
Primary key fingerprint: 249C B377 1750 745D 5CDD  323C E267 B052 364F 028D
jas@kaka:~/src/neug$ cd ../gnuk/
jas@kaka:~/src/gnuk$ git checkout STABLE-BRANCH-1-2 
Branch 'STABLE-BRANCH-1-2' set up to track remote branch 'STABLE-BRANCH-1-2' from 'origin'.
Switched to a new branch 'STABLE-BRANCH-1-2'
jas@kaka:~/src/gnuk$ git describe
release/1.2.20
jas@kaka:~/src/gnuk$ git tag -v  git describe 
object 9d3c08bd2beb73ce942b016d4328f0a596096c02
type commit
tag release/1.2.20
tagger NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org> 1650594032 +0900
Gnuk: Version 1.2.20
gpg: Signature made Fri Apr 22 04:20:32 2022 CEST
gpg:                using EDDSA key 249CB3771750745D5CDD323CE267B052364F028D
gpg: Good signature from "NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>" [unknown]
gpg:                 aka "NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@debian.org>" [unknown]
gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
gpg:          There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
Primary key fingerprint: 249C B377 1750 745D 5CDD  323C E267 B052 364F 028D
jas@kaka:~/src/gnuk/src$ git submodule update --init
Submodule 'chopstx' (https://salsa.debian.org/gnuk-team/chopstx/chopstx.git) registered for path '../chopstx'
Cloning into '/home/jas/src/gnuk/chopstx'...
Submodule path '../chopstx': checked out 'e12a7e0bb3f004c7bca41cfdb24c8b66daf3db89'
jas@kaka:~/src/gnuk$ cd chopstx
jas@kaka:~/src/gnuk/chopstx$ git describe
release/1.21
jas@kaka:~/src/gnuk/chopstx$ git tag -v  git describe 
object e12a7e0bb3f004c7bca41cfdb24c8b66daf3db89
type commit
tag release/1.21
tagger NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org> 1650593697 +0900
Chopstx: Version 1.21
gpg: Signature made Fri Apr 22 04:14:57 2022 CEST
gpg:                using EDDSA key 249CB3771750745D5CDD323CE267B052364F028D
gpg: Good signature from "NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>" [unknown]
gpg:                 aka "NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@debian.org>" [unknown]
gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
gpg:          There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
Primary key fingerprint: 249C B377 1750 745D 5CDD  323C E267 B052 364F 028D
jas@kaka:~/src/gnuk/chopstx$ cd ../src
jas@kaka:~/src/gnuk/src$ kdf_do=required ./configure --enable-factory-reset --vidpid=234b:0000 --target=FST_01SZ
Header file is: board-fst-01sz.h
Debug option disabled
Configured for bare system (no-DFU)
PIN pad option disabled
CERT.3 Data Object is NOT supported
Card insert/removal by HID device is NOT supported
Life cycle management is supported
Acknowledge button is supported
KDF DO is required before key import/generation
jas@kaka:~/src/gnuk/src$ make   less
jas@kaka:~/src/gnuk/src$ cd ../regnual/
jas@kaka:~/src/gnuk/regnual$ make   less
jas@kaka:~/src/gnuk/regnual$ cd ../../
jas@kaka:~/src$ sudo python3 neug/tool/neug_upgrade.py -f gnuk/regnual/regnual.bin gnuk/src/build/gnuk.bin
gnuk/regnual/regnual.bin: 4608
gnuk/src/build/gnuk.bin: 109568
CRC32: b93ca829
Device: 
Configuration: 1
Interface: 1
20000e00:20005000
Downloading flash upgrade program...
start 20000e00
end   20002000
# 20002000: 32 : 4
Run flash upgrade program...
Wait 1 second...
Wait 1 second...
Device: 
08001000:08020000
Downloading the program
start 08001000
end   0801ac00
jas@kaka:~/src$
The kernel log will contain the following, and the card is ready to use as an OpenPGP card. You may unplug it and re-insert it as you wish. 

usb 3-3: reset full-speed USB device number 41 using xhci_hcd
usb 3-3: device firmware changed
usb 3-3: USB disconnect, device number 41
usb 3-3: new full-speed USB device number 42 using xhci_hcd
usb 3-3: New USB device found, idVendor=234b, idProduct=0000, bcdDevice= 2.00
usb 3-3: New USB device strings: Mfr=1, Product=2, SerialNumber=3
usb 3-3: Product: Gnuk Token
usb 3-3: Manufacturer: Free Software Initiative of Japan
usb 3-3: SerialNumber: FSIJ-1.2.20-42315277
Setting up the card is the next step, and there are many tutorials around for this, eventually I settled with the following sequence. Let s start with setting the admin PIN. First make sure that pcscd nor scdaemon is running, which is good hygien since those processes cache some information and with a stale connection this easily leads to confusion. Cache invalidation sigh. 

jas@kaka:~$ gpg-connect-agent "SCD KILLSCD" "SCD BYE" /bye
jas@kaka:~$ ps auxww grep -e pcsc -e scd
jas        30221  0.0  0.0   3468  1692 pts/3    R+   11:49   0:00 grep --color=auto -e pcsc -e scd
jas@kaka:~$ gpg --card-edit
Reader ...........: 234B:0000:FSIJ-1.2.20-42315277:0
Application ID ...: D276000124010200FFFE423152770000
Application type .: OpenPGP
Version ..........: 2.0
Manufacturer .....: unmanaged S/N range
Serial number ....: 42315277
Name of cardholder: [not set]
Language prefs ...: [not set]
Salutation .......: 
URL of public key : [not set]
Login data .......: [not set]
Signature PIN ....: forced
Key attributes ...: rsa2048 rsa2048 rsa2048
Max. PIN lengths .: 127 127 127
PIN retry counter : 3 3 3
Signature counter : 0
KDF setting ......: off
Signature key ....: [none]
Encryption key....: [none]
Authentication key: [none]
General key info..: [none]
gpg/card> admin
Admin commands are allowed
gpg/card> kdf-setup
gpg/card> passwd
gpg: OpenPGP card no. D276000124010200FFFE423152770000 detected
1 - change PIN
2 - unblock PIN
3 - change Admin PIN
4 - set the Reset Code
Q - quit
Your selection? 3
PIN changed.
1 - change PIN
2 - unblock PIN
3 - change Admin PIN
4 - set the Reset Code
Q - quit
Your selection?
Now it would be natural to setup the PIN and reset code. However the Gnuk software is configured to not allow this until the keys are imported. You would get the following somewhat cryptical error messages if you try. This took me a while to understand, since this is device-specific, and some other OpenPGP implementations allows you to configure a PIN and reset code before key import. 

Your selection? 4
Error setting the Reset Code: Card error
1 - change PIN
2 - unblock PIN
3 - change Admin PIN
4 - set the Reset Code
Q - quit
Your selection? 1
Error changing the PIN: Conditions of use not satisfied
1 - change PIN
2 - unblock PIN
3 - change Admin PIN
4 - set the Reset Code
Q - quit
Your selection? q
Continue to configure the card and make it ready for key import. Some settings deserve comments. The lang field may be used to setup the language, but I have rarely seen it use, and I set it to sv (Swedish) mostly to be able to experiment if any software adhears to it. The URL is important to point to somewhere where your public key is stored, the fetch command of gpg --card-edit downloads it and sets up GnuPG with it when you are on a clean new laptop. The forcesig command changes the default so that a PIN code is not required for every digital signature operation, remember that I averaged 10 signatures per day for the past 2-3 years? Think of the wasted energy typing those PIN codes every time! Changing the cryptographic key type is required when I import 25519-based keys. 

gpg/card> name
Cardholder's surname: Josefsson
Cardholder's given name: Simon
gpg/card> lang
Language preferences: sv
gpg/card> sex
Salutation (M = Mr., F = Ms., or space): m
gpg/card> login
Login data (account name): jas
gpg/card> url
URL to retrieve public key: https://josefsson.org/key-20190320.txt
gpg/card> forcesig
gpg/card> key-attr
Changing card key attribute for: Signature key
Please select what kind of key you want:
   (1) RSA
   (2) ECC
Your selection? 2
Please select which elliptic curve you want:
   (1) Curve 25519
   (4) NIST P-384
Your selection? 1
The card will now be re-configured to generate a key of type: ed25519
Note: There is no guarantee that the card supports the requested size.
      If the key generation does not succeed, please check the
      documentation of your card to see what sizes are allowed.
Changing card key attribute for: Encryption key
Please select what kind of key you want:
   (1) RSA
   (2) ECC
Your selection? 2
Please select which elliptic curve you want:
   (1) Curve 25519
   (4) NIST P-384
Your selection? 1
The card will now be re-configured to generate a key of type: cv25519
Changing card key attribute for: Authentication key
Please select what kind of key you want:
   (1) RSA
   (2) ECC
Your selection? 2
Please select which elliptic curve you want:
   (1) Curve 25519
   (4) NIST P-384
Your selection? 1
The card will now be re-configured to generate a key of type: ed25519
gpg/card> 
Reader ...........: 234B:0000:FSIJ-1.2.20-42315277:0
Application ID ...: D276000124010200FFFE423152770000
Application type .: OpenPGP
Version ..........: 2.0
Manufacturer .....: unmanaged S/N range
Serial number ....: 42315277
Name of cardholder: Simon Josefsson
Language prefs ...: sv
Salutation .......: Mr.
URL of public key : https://josefsson.org/key-20190320.txt
Login data .......: jas
Signature PIN ....: not forced
Key attributes ...: ed25519 cv25519 ed25519
Max. PIN lengths .: 127 127 127
PIN retry counter : 3 3 3
Signature counter : 0
KDF setting ......: on
Signature key ....: [none]
Encryption key....: [none]
Authentication key: [none]
General key info..: [none]
gpg/card>
The device is now ready for key import! Bring out your offline laptop and boot it and use the keytocard command on the subkeys to import them. This assumes you saved a copy of the GnuPG home directory after generating the master and subkeys before, which I did in my own previous tutorial when I generated the keys. This may be a bit unusual, and there are simpler ways to do this (e.g., import a copy of the secret keys into a fresh GnuPG home directory). 

$ cp -a gnupghome-backup-mastersubkeys gnupghome-import-fst01sz-42315277-2022-12-24
$ ps auxww grep -e pcsc -e scd
$ gpg --homedir $PWD/gnupghome-import-fst01sz-42315277-2022-12-24 --edit-key B1D2BD1375BECB784CF4F8C4D73CF638C53C06BE
...
Secret key is available.
gpg: checking the trustdb
gpg: marginals needed: 3  completes needed: 1  trust model: pgp
gpg: depth: 0  valid:   1  signed:   0  trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u
sec  ed25519/D73CF638C53C06BE
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: SC  
     trust: ultimate      validity: expired
ssb  cv25519/02923D7EE76EBD60
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: E   
ssb  ed25519/80260EE8A9B92B2B
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: A   
ssb  ed25519/51722B08FE4745A2
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: S   
[ expired] (1). Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
gpg> key 1
sec  ed25519/D73CF638C53C06BE
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: SC  
     trust: ultimate      validity: expired
ssb* cv25519/02923D7EE76EBD60
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: E   
ssb  ed25519/80260EE8A9B92B2B
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: A   
ssb  ed25519/51722B08FE4745A2
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: S   
[ expired] (1). Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
gpg> keytocard
Please select where to store the key:
   (2) Encryption key
Your selection? 2
sec  ed25519/D73CF638C53C06BE
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: SC  
     trust: ultimate      validity: expired
ssb* cv25519/02923D7EE76EBD60
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: E   
ssb  ed25519/80260EE8A9B92B2B
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: A   
ssb  ed25519/51722B08FE4745A2
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: S   
[ expired] (1). Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
gpg> key 1
sec  ed25519/D73CF638C53C06BE
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: SC  
     trust: ultimate      validity: expired
ssb  cv25519/02923D7EE76EBD60
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: E   
ssb  ed25519/80260EE8A9B92B2B
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: A   
ssb  ed25519/51722B08FE4745A2
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: S   
[ expired] (1). Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
gpg> key 2

sec  ed25519/D73CF638C53C06BE
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: SC  
     trust: ultimate      validity: expired
ssb  cv25519/02923D7EE76EBD60
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: E   
ssb* ed25519/80260EE8A9B92B2B
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: A   
ssb  ed25519/51722B08FE4745A2
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: S   
[ expired] (1). Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
gpg> keytocard
Please select where to store the key:
   (3) Authentication key
Your selection? 3
sec  ed25519/D73CF638C53C06BE
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: SC  
     trust: ultimate      validity: expired
ssb  cv25519/02923D7EE76EBD60
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: E   
ssb* ed25519/80260EE8A9B92B2B
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: A   
ssb  ed25519/51722B08FE4745A2
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: S   
[ expired] (1). Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
gpg> key 2
sec  ed25519/D73CF638C53C06BE
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: SC  
     trust: ultimate      validity: expired
ssb  cv25519/02923D7EE76EBD60
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: E   
ssb  ed25519/80260EE8A9B92B2B
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: A   
ssb  ed25519/51722B08FE4745A2
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: S   
[ expired] (1). Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
gpg> key 3
sec  ed25519/D73CF638C53C06BE
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: SC  
     trust: ultimate      validity: expired
ssb  cv25519/02923D7EE76EBD60
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: E   
ssb  ed25519/80260EE8A9B92B2B
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: A   
ssb* ed25519/51722B08FE4745A2
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: S   
[ expired] (1). Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
gpg> keytocard
Please select where to store the key:
   (1) Signature key
   (3) Authentication key
Your selection? 1
sec  ed25519/D73CF638C53C06BE
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: SC  
     trust: ultimate      validity: expired
ssb  cv25519/02923D7EE76EBD60
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: E   
ssb  ed25519/80260EE8A9B92B2B
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: A   
ssb* ed25519/51722B08FE4745A2
     created: 2019-03-20  expired: 2019-10-22  usage: S   
[ expired] (1). Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
gpg> quit
Save changes? (y/N) y
$
Now insert it into your daily laptop and have GnuPG and learn about the new private keys and forget about any earlier locally available card bindings this usually manifests itself by GnuPG asking you to insert a OpenPGP card with another serial number. Earlier I did rm -rf ~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/ but the scd serialno followed by learn --force is nicer. I also sets up trust setting for my own key. 

jas@kaka:~$ gpg-connect-agent "scd serialno" "learn --force" /bye
...
jas@kaka:~$ echo "B1D2BD1375BECB784CF4F8C4D73CF638C53C06BE:6:"   gpg --import-ownertrust
jas@kaka:~$ gpg --card-status
Reader ...........: 234B:0000:FSIJ-1.2.20-42315277:0
Application ID ...: D276000124010200FFFE423152770000
Application type .: OpenPGP
Version ..........: 2.0
Manufacturer .....: unmanaged S/N range
Serial number ....: 42315277
Name of cardholder: Simon Josefsson
Language prefs ...: sv
Salutation .......: Mr.
URL of public key : https://josefsson.org/key-20190320.txt
Login data .......: jas
Signature PIN ....: not forced
Key attributes ...: ed25519 cv25519 ed25519
Max. PIN lengths .: 127 127 127
PIN retry counter : 5 5 5
Signature counter : 3
KDF setting ......: on
Signature key ....: A3CC 9C87 0B9D 310A BAD4  CF2F 5172 2B08 FE47 45A2
      created ....: 2019-03-20 23:40:49
Encryption key....: A9EC 8F4D 7F1E 50ED 3DEF  49A9 0292 3D7E E76E BD60
      created ....: 2019-03-20 23:40:26
Authentication key: CA7E 3716 4342 DF31 33DF  3497 8026 0EE8 A9B9 2B2B
      created ....: 2019-03-20 23:40:37
General key info..: sub  ed25519/51722B08FE4745A2 2019-03-20 Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
sec#  ed25519/D73CF638C53C06BE  created: 2019-03-20  expires: 2023-09-19
ssb>  ed25519/80260EE8A9B92B2B  created: 2019-03-20  expires: 2023-09-19
                                card-no: FFFE 42315277
ssb>  ed25519/51722B08FE4745A2  created: 2019-03-20  expires: 2023-09-19
                                card-no: FFFE 42315277
ssb>  cv25519/02923D7EE76EBD60  created: 2019-03-20  expires: 2023-09-19
                                card-no: FFFE 42315277
jas@kaka:~$
Verify that you can digitally sign and authenticate using the key and you are done! 

jas@kaka:~$ echo foo gpg -a --sign gpg --verify
gpg: Signature made Sat Dec 24 13:49:59 2022 CET
gpg:                using EDDSA key A3CC9C870B9D310ABAD4CF2F51722B08FE4745A2
gpg: Good signature from "Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>" [ultimate]
jas@kaka:~$ ssh-add -L
ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAILzCFcHHrKzVSPDDarZPYqn89H5TPaxwcORgRg+4DagE cardno:FFFE42315277
jas@kaka:~$
So time to relax and celebrate christmas? Hold on not so fast! Astute readers will have noticed that the output said PIN retry counter: 5 5 5 . That s not the default PIN retry counter for Gnuk! How did that happen? Indeed, good catch and great question, my dear reader. I wanted to include how you can modify the Gnuk source code, re-build it and re-flash the Gnuk as well. This method is different than flashing Gnuk onto a device that is running NeuG so the commands I used to flash the firmware in the start of this blog post no longer works in a device running Gnuk. Fortunately modern Gnuk supports updating firmware by specifying the Admin PIN code only, and provides a simple script to achieve this as well. The PIN retry counter setting is hard coded in the openpgp-do.c file, and we run a a perl command to modify the file, rebuild Gnuk and upgrade the FST-01SZ. This of course wipes all your settings, so you will have the opportunity to practice all the commands earlier in this post once again! 

jas@kaka:~/src/gnuk/src$ perl -pi -e 's/PASSWORD_ERRORS_MAX 3/PASSWORD_ERRORS_MAX 5/' openpgp-do.c
jas@kaka:~/src/gnuk/src$ make   less
jas@kaka:~/src/gnuk/src$ cd ../tool/
jas@kaka:~/src/gnuk/tool$ ./upgrade_by_passwd.py 
Admin password: 
Device: 
Configuration: 1
Interface: 0
../regnual/regnual.bin: 4608
../src/build/gnuk.bin: 110592
CRC32: b93ca829
Device: 
Configuration: 1
Interface: 0
20002a00:20005000
Downloading flash upgrade program...
start 20002a00
end   20003c00
Run flash upgrade program...
Waiting for device to appear:
  Wait 1 second...
  Wait 1 second...
Device: 
08001000:08020000
Downloading the program
start 08001000
end   0801b000
Protecting device
Finish flashing
Resetting device
Update procedure finished
jas@kaka:~/src/gnuk/tool$
Now finally, I wish you all a Merry Christmas and Happy Hacking!

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